At Christianity Today, Stephen Meyer repeats the falsehood that "We know that information—whether inscribed in hieroglyphics, written in a book, or encoded in a radio signal—always comes from an intelligent source." It's simply not so - for example, in the Kolmogorov theory, any random source produces information. Even in Meyer's own idiosyncratic definition of information, natural systems produce information - such as when you stick your head out the window to see if it will rain that day. Where did you get that information? Not from any intelligent source.
And he adds some new falsehoods: "My recent book on the subject received enthusiastic endorsements from many scientists not previously known as advocates of ID, such as chemist Philip Skell, a National Academy of Sciences member..."
As is well-known to anyone who follows the creation-evolution debate, Philip Skell is a longtime evolution opponent. His anti-evolution activity dates from at least 2000, and he has been quite active since then.
Meyer also claims, "those who reject ID within the scientific community do so not because they have a better explanation of the relevant evidence, but because they affirm a definition of science that requires them to reject explanations involving intelligence—whatever the evidence shows". Scientists don't reject explanations involving "intelligence"; they simply don't find "intelligence" alone to be a useful explanation for most phenomena. No archaeologist finds a potsherd and exclaims, "Intelligence must have been involved in the creation of this pot!" To do so would be regarded as moronic. Rather, archaeologists spend their time figuring out who made an artifact, what they used it for, and how it fits into a larger understanding of the human culture it was a part of. Contrary to Meyer's bogus claim, fields like archaeology have no problem incorporating human agency into their studies. But no scientific field incorporates agency without some evidence of the agent actually existing - something Meyer has yet to provide.
If ID wants to be taken seriously, ID advocates have to distance themselves from spokesmen who are more interested in public relations than scientific truth.
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Tuesday, May 25, 2010
How to Test for Syphilis
Yesterday on NPR's "All Things Considered" I heard this segment about "sparsity", which tried to link several different issues about data compression in one story. I don't think it was very successful, and the chosen term "sparsity" wasn't really representative of the content.
Nevertheless, the piece opened up with an interesting puzzle. The Army wants to do comprehensive blood tests for syphilis, a relatively rare disease, but each individual test is expensive. How can they test everyone more cheaply?
The idea is simple: mix the blood of g individuals together, and test that. A positive outcome indicates that at least one person in the group has syphilis, and a negative outcome indicates that no person in the group has it. In the event of a positive outcome, test all the members of the group.
Now let p be the probability that a randomly-chosen person has syphilis, and let N be the population size. What is the optimal size for the group? Choose g too small, and you end up doing lots of tests, because N/g (the number of groups) is large. Choose g too large, and it becomes very likely that testing the group will be positive, so you end up doing lots of tests again. Somewhere in between is the optimal choice of g.
How do we find it? There are N/g groups, and we have to test each of them. A randomly-chosen person fails to have syphilis with probability 1-p, so the probability that everyone in the group fails to have it is (1-p)g. Hence the probability that a group tests positive is 1-(1-p)g, and the expected number of positive-testing groups is (N/g)(1-(1-p)g). We have to test each person in a positive group, so this means g(N/g)(1-(1-p)g) = N(1-(1-p)g) additional tests. If the cost of a test is C, then the total cost is CN/g (the cost to test each group), plus CN(1-(1-p)g) (the cost to test everyone in the positive-testing groups). Factoring out CN, we need to minimize
1/g + 1 - (1-p)g. (1)
Notice that this expression only depends on p, the probability.
We can, in fact, find a closed form for this minimum (or at least Maple can), but it is somewhat complicated, and depends on the little-known Lambert W-function. It's easier to compute the minimum through bisection or some other method for any particular p. A recent estimate is that syphilis occurs in about 15.4 per 100,000 people, which corresponds to p = .000154. For this value of p, the optimal g is g = 81, which gives (1) the value of .0247. Thus, for this p, we are able to test everyone by combining tests -- for less than 3% of the cost of testing everyone individually.
By the way, a simple heuristic argument suggests that the g that minimizes (1) will be about p-½: to minimize (1), choose g so that the two terms in the sum (1), 1/g and 1-(1-p)g, are equal. Set g = p-½; then 1/g = p½. On the other hand, 1-(1-p)g = 1 - (1-g-2)g. But (1-1/g)g is about 1/e for large g, so using the Taylor series for exp(x), we see that 1 - (1-g-2)g is about 1/g, too. So this choice of g will be very close to the one minimizing (1), and the value of (1) is therefore about 2/g = 2 p½.
Added: with more complicated tests (see the comments), one can do even better. But some of the proposed methods are so complicated that it seems to me the possibility of human error in carrying them out would rule them out.
Nevertheless, the piece opened up with an interesting puzzle. The Army wants to do comprehensive blood tests for syphilis, a relatively rare disease, but each individual test is expensive. How can they test everyone more cheaply?
The idea is simple: mix the blood of g individuals together, and test that. A positive outcome indicates that at least one person in the group has syphilis, and a negative outcome indicates that no person in the group has it. In the event of a positive outcome, test all the members of the group.
Now let p be the probability that a randomly-chosen person has syphilis, and let N be the population size. What is the optimal size for the group? Choose g too small, and you end up doing lots of tests, because N/g (the number of groups) is large. Choose g too large, and it becomes very likely that testing the group will be positive, so you end up doing lots of tests again. Somewhere in between is the optimal choice of g.
How do we find it? There are N/g groups, and we have to test each of them. A randomly-chosen person fails to have syphilis with probability 1-p, so the probability that everyone in the group fails to have it is (1-p)g. Hence the probability that a group tests positive is 1-(1-p)g, and the expected number of positive-testing groups is (N/g)(1-(1-p)g). We have to test each person in a positive group, so this means g(N/g)(1-(1-p)g) = N(1-(1-p)g) additional tests. If the cost of a test is C, then the total cost is CN/g (the cost to test each group), plus CN(1-(1-p)g) (the cost to test everyone in the positive-testing groups). Factoring out CN, we need to minimize
1/g + 1 - (1-p)g. (1)
Notice that this expression only depends on p, the probability.
We can, in fact, find a closed form for this minimum (or at least Maple can), but it is somewhat complicated, and depends on the little-known Lambert W-function. It's easier to compute the minimum through bisection or some other method for any particular p. A recent estimate is that syphilis occurs in about 15.4 per 100,000 people, which corresponds to p = .000154. For this value of p, the optimal g is g = 81, which gives (1) the value of .0247. Thus, for this p, we are able to test everyone by combining tests -- for less than 3% of the cost of testing everyone individually.
By the way, a simple heuristic argument suggests that the g that minimizes (1) will be about p-½: to minimize (1), choose g so that the two terms in the sum (1), 1/g and 1-(1-p)g, are equal. Set g = p-½; then 1/g = p½. On the other hand, 1-(1-p)g = 1 - (1-g-2)g. But (1-1/g)g is about 1/e for large g, so using the Taylor series for exp(x), we see that 1 - (1-g-2)g is about 1/g, too. So this choice of g will be very close to the one minimizing (1), and the value of (1) is therefore about 2/g = 2 p½.
Added: with more complicated tests (see the comments), one can do even better. But some of the proposed methods are so complicated that it seems to me the possibility of human error in carrying them out would rule them out.
Saturday, May 22, 2010
Charlie Went Through the Dryer
Son #2 put his Charlie Card (the electronic card that lets you ride on Boston public transit) through the dryer.
Twice.
Believe it or not, it still works.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Turing vs. the Creationists
Today we bring you your daily dose of breathtaking inanity from the creationist blog Uncommon Descent. A poster named "niwrad" (that's "Darwin" spelled backwards - the creationists are oh-so-clever) finds yet another reason to reject Darwinism.
"niwrad" draws an analogy with computer programming, and then "explain[s] as clearly as possible exactly what a program is". He goes on to say, "In order to process information – i.e. create software – it is necessary to create data and programs. Data is passive information: it cannot change or decide anything by itself" while "a program, in its simplest concept, is a blueprint specifying the reiteration of basic decision structures, about what to do and when to do it."
He/she then goes to say, "The argument which I am putting forward here cuts through these definitional controversies, because from my informatics-based perspective there are really only two possibilities, which can be summarized as follows: either (a) genes are data (which corresponds to the above old definition of a gene); or (b) genes are functions (which corresponds to the new definition)", gives incoherent reasons for rejecting both views, and concludes, "To sum up: Darwinism, from an informatics point of view, has absolutely zero credibility."
Poor "niwrad". He/she/it never learned much computer science, because we have known at least since 1936 that the artificial distinction between "program" and "data" is illusory. The existence of a universal machine shows that we can treat programs and data in the same fashion. That, indeed, was one of the fundamental insights of Alan Turing in his famous paper, "On computable numbers...". As Kleinberg and Papadimitriou remark, "Indeed, our style of writing programs and then executing them is so ingrained in our view of computation that it takes a moment to appreciate the consequences that flow from a universal machine. It means that programs and data are really the same thing: a program is just a sequence of symbols that looks like any other piece of input; but when fed to a universal machine, this input wakes up and begins to compute. Think of mobile code, java applets, e-mail viruses: your computer downloads them as data, and then runs them as programs."
Furthermore, we know from the field of DNA computing that very simple abstract operations, corresponding to the physics and chemistry of DNA, can simulate universal computation.
If creationists want to avoid being defeated by the ghost of Alan Turing, they need to spend more time reading about what is known in computer science and biology, and less time proclaiming (as "niwrad" did) that "God, also in this case, expects far less from us than what He Himself did and does".
"niwrad" draws an analogy with computer programming, and then "explain[s] as clearly as possible exactly what a program is". He goes on to say, "In order to process information – i.e. create software – it is necessary to create data and programs. Data is passive information: it cannot change or decide anything by itself" while "a program, in its simplest concept, is a blueprint specifying the reiteration of basic decision structures, about what to do and when to do it."
He/she then goes to say, "The argument which I am putting forward here cuts through these definitional controversies, because from my informatics-based perspective there are really only two possibilities, which can be summarized as follows: either (a) genes are data (which corresponds to the above old definition of a gene); or (b) genes are functions (which corresponds to the new definition)", gives incoherent reasons for rejecting both views, and concludes, "To sum up: Darwinism, from an informatics point of view, has absolutely zero credibility."
Poor "niwrad". He/she/it never learned much computer science, because we have known at least since 1936 that the artificial distinction between "program" and "data" is illusory. The existence of a universal machine shows that we can treat programs and data in the same fashion. That, indeed, was one of the fundamental insights of Alan Turing in his famous paper, "On computable numbers...". As Kleinberg and Papadimitriou remark, "Indeed, our style of writing programs and then executing them is so ingrained in our view of computation that it takes a moment to appreciate the consequences that flow from a universal machine. It means that programs and data are really the same thing: a program is just a sequence of symbols that looks like any other piece of input; but when fed to a universal machine, this input wakes up and begins to compute. Think of mobile code, java applets, e-mail viruses: your computer downloads them as data, and then runs them as programs."
Furthermore, we know from the field of DNA computing that very simple abstract operations, corresponding to the physics and chemistry of DNA, can simulate universal computation.
If creationists want to avoid being defeated by the ghost of Alan Turing, they need to spend more time reading about what is known in computer science and biology, and less time proclaiming (as "niwrad" did) that "God, also in this case, expects far less from us than what He Himself did and does".
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Atheism - The Energy-Efficient Worldview
Spotted on a bus in Boston yesterday:
I guess that makes atheism the energy-efficient worldview. Go green!
I guess that makes atheism the energy-efficient worldview. Go green!
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
An Academic Challenge
Today I saw the following poster at MIT:
This is the brainchild of the folks at phdchallenge.org. They want someone to get the phrase "I smoke crack rocks" into a scientific paper before December 1 of this year.
But someone at the challenge must have been smoking something, because in the FAQ, they say, "If your potential contest entry contains at least 90% of the words from challenge phrase, you may still submit it. For example, for the 2010 PhD Challenge, submissions containing the phrases I SMOKE CRACK and SMOKE CRACK ROCKS are valid and would be considered in the final judging." They seem to think that 75% is greater than or equal to 90%.
This is the brainchild of the folks at phdchallenge.org. They want someone to get the phrase "I smoke crack rocks" into a scientific paper before December 1 of this year.
But someone at the challenge must have been smoking something, because in the FAQ, they say, "If your potential contest entry contains at least 90% of the words from challenge phrase, you may still submit it. For example, for the 2010 PhD Challenge, submissions containing the phrases I SMOKE CRACK and SMOKE CRACK ROCKS are valid and would be considered in the final judging." They seem to think that 75% is greater than or equal to 90%.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
A Question for Christians
Here's a question for Christians - I'm genuinely interested in hearing your thoughts and I won't take issue with what you say.
Read this short blog post by Christian philosopher Doug Groothuis:
The more we submit to the higher, the more control we have over ourselves, and the more we find our place with that which is equal to us and and with that which is lower. Otherwise, we botch the hierarchy and bring (even more) chaos into this wounded world.
What do you make of it? Do you find it deep, or shallow? Insightful or fatuous? Meaningful or meaningless?
I'll give you my opinion in the comments, eventually, so as not to poison the well too much.
Read this short blog post by Christian philosopher Doug Groothuis:
The more we submit to the higher, the more control we have over ourselves, and the more we find our place with that which is equal to us and and with that which is lower. Otherwise, we botch the hierarchy and bring (even more) chaos into this wounded world.
What do you make of it? Do you find it deep, or shallow? Insightful or fatuous? Meaningful or meaningless?
I'll give you my opinion in the comments, eventually, so as not to poison the well too much.
Thursday, May 06, 2010
Do Asthmatics Really Sneeze at Plastic Flowers?
Do asthmatics really sneeze at plastic flowers, presuming them to be real?
So a variety of papers, books, and websites -- many of them arguing that the mind is "immaterial" -- would have you believe. Just to list a few:
James Le Fanu, in his 2009 book Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves, writes (p. 219): "it is well recognised, for example, that asthmatics sneeze in the presence of plastic flowers, presuming them to be real", but he gives no citation.
Kenneth R. Pelletier, in a chapter "Between mind and body: stress, emotions and health" in a 1993 Consumer Reports book edited by D. Goleman and J. Gurin entitled Mind Body Medicine: How to Use Your Mind for Better Health, claims in the very first line of his article that "Asthmatics sneeze at plastic flowers" (p. 19). He gives no citation, but repeats this claim in his 1995 book Sound Mind, Sound Body: A New Model for Lifelong Health, writing (p. 79): "Control is the vital link between mind and body. It is the pivotal point between psychological attitudes and our physical responses. Asthmatics sneeze at plastic flowers."
Anees A. Sheikh, in his 2002 book Healing images: the role of imagination in health quotes Pelletier, as does Max Velmans, in a paper entitled How could conscious experiences affect brains? that appeared in the Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11) (2002), 3-29.
Arthur V. N. Brooks, in a paper presented at the Philosophical Club of Cleveland in 1993, asks "Why do asthmatics sneeze at plastic flowers?" No citation is given.
Christopher Gilbert, a physician currently at Kaiser Permanente in San Francisco, writes in a 1998 article in the Journal of Bodywork and Movement Therapies that "Asthma attacks, for example, can be set off by plastic flowers if the individual has had asthma responses to flowers in the past, and believes the flowers are real."
Naomi Judd, in her 1994 autobiography Love Can Build a Bridge, writes (p. 449) that "The mind is the deepest influence on the body. Asthmatics have been known to sneeze at plastic flowers." She seems to be citing Pelletier (1993).
A 1923 address by W. Langdon Brown that appeared in Proc. Roy. Soc. Med. 16 (1923), 1-16. He says, "That asthma often occurs in neuropathic families, and that asthmatics are unduly suggestible, are well-known facts. The paroxysm excited by an artificial flower figures in every text-book."
And what appears to be the original citation is an 1886 paper entitled "The production of the so-called "rose cold" by means of an artificial rose", by John Noland Mackenzie, in the American Journal of the Medical Sciences.
With all these citations, it would certainly seem to be a fact, right?
Not so fast.
First, single anecdotal examples (like that given in the 1886 paper) are not very convincing. There are lots of reasons other than psychological ones why someone allergic to flowers might sneeze in the presence of a plastic flower - such as, for example, having an allergy to plastic or residues of chemicals used to make plastic. That's why a controlled study would be needed to be truly convincing.
Second, Neville J. King, in the Journal of Behavioral Medicine 3 (2) (1980), 169-189, wrote, "The classical conditioning of human asthma attacks also has yet to be reliably demonstrated. Despite the many anecdotal cases of human asthma attacks elicited by the sight of dust and artificial flowers (Dunbar, 1954; McGovern and Knight, 1967) which are consistent with a classical conditioning model of asthma, attempts at the classical conditioning of human asthma in the laboratory have not been successful. Of approximately 100 asthmatic patients, Dekker et al. (1957) could succeed in classically conditioning asthma attacks to apparatus used in allergy investigations in only 2 of these patients. Also, Knapp (1963) reported negative findings after a careful and elaborate series of experiments on conditioned asthma in human beings. As Purcell and Weiss (1970) concluded in their review, "it appears accurate to state that, with either animals or human beings, the successful conditioning of asthma remains to be demonstrated, even in the opinion of those investigations whose original positive reports on conditioning are cited frequently" (p. 607).
Asthma is a common disease with a strong genetic component. If you have two asthmatic parents, your chances of developing asthma are about 1 in 2. Asthmatics react to various allergens and to infections of the upper respiratory system. In the 1930's, under the influence of Freud's batty ideas, many people claimed asthma was due to "separation anxiety", a claim that has since been discredited. Later, it has been claimed by some doctors that asthma was just a conditioned response, but as we have seen, this has not been demonstrated rigorously.
All in all, I am skeptical of the claim that asthmatics sneeze at plastic flowers. Even if it were true, I don't see how it supports the claim that the mind is "immaterial". I know very little about neuroscience, but it doesn't seem that farfetched to me that an neural network could, after repeated stimulation, associate some autonomic response such as sneezing, with some visual stimulation. No supernatural explanation seems to be required.
So a variety of papers, books, and websites -- many of them arguing that the mind is "immaterial" -- would have you believe. Just to list a few:
James Le Fanu, in his 2009 book Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves, writes (p. 219): "it is well recognised, for example, that asthmatics sneeze in the presence of plastic flowers, presuming them to be real", but he gives no citation.
Kenneth R. Pelletier, in a chapter "Between mind and body: stress, emotions and health" in a 1993 Consumer Reports book edited by D. Goleman and J. Gurin entitled Mind Body Medicine: How to Use Your Mind for Better Health, claims in the very first line of his article that "Asthmatics sneeze at plastic flowers" (p. 19). He gives no citation, but repeats this claim in his 1995 book Sound Mind, Sound Body: A New Model for Lifelong Health, writing (p. 79): "Control is the vital link between mind and body. It is the pivotal point between psychological attitudes and our physical responses. Asthmatics sneeze at plastic flowers."
Anees A. Sheikh, in his 2002 book Healing images: the role of imagination in health quotes Pelletier, as does Max Velmans, in a paper entitled How could conscious experiences affect brains? that appeared in the Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11) (2002), 3-29.
Arthur V. N. Brooks, in a paper presented at the Philosophical Club of Cleveland in 1993, asks "Why do asthmatics sneeze at plastic flowers?" No citation is given.
Christopher Gilbert, a physician currently at Kaiser Permanente in San Francisco, writes in a 1998 article in the Journal of Bodywork and Movement Therapies that "Asthma attacks, for example, can be set off by plastic flowers if the individual has had asthma responses to flowers in the past, and believes the flowers are real."
Naomi Judd, in her 1994 autobiography Love Can Build a Bridge, writes (p. 449) that "The mind is the deepest influence on the body. Asthmatics have been known to sneeze at plastic flowers." She seems to be citing Pelletier (1993).
A 1923 address by W. Langdon Brown that appeared in Proc. Roy. Soc. Med. 16 (1923), 1-16. He says, "That asthma often occurs in neuropathic families, and that asthmatics are unduly suggestible, are well-known facts. The paroxysm excited by an artificial flower figures in every text-book."
And what appears to be the original citation is an 1886 paper entitled "The production of the so-called "rose cold" by means of an artificial rose", by John Noland Mackenzie, in the American Journal of the Medical Sciences.
With all these citations, it would certainly seem to be a fact, right?
Not so fast.
First, single anecdotal examples (like that given in the 1886 paper) are not very convincing. There are lots of reasons other than psychological ones why someone allergic to flowers might sneeze in the presence of a plastic flower - such as, for example, having an allergy to plastic or residues of chemicals used to make plastic. That's why a controlled study would be needed to be truly convincing.
Second, Neville J. King, in the Journal of Behavioral Medicine 3 (2) (1980), 169-189, wrote, "The classical conditioning of human asthma attacks also has yet to be reliably demonstrated. Despite the many anecdotal cases of human asthma attacks elicited by the sight of dust and artificial flowers (Dunbar, 1954; McGovern and Knight, 1967) which are consistent with a classical conditioning model of asthma, attempts at the classical conditioning of human asthma in the laboratory have not been successful. Of approximately 100 asthmatic patients, Dekker et al. (1957) could succeed in classically conditioning asthma attacks to apparatus used in allergy investigations in only 2 of these patients. Also, Knapp (1963) reported negative findings after a careful and elaborate series of experiments on conditioned asthma in human beings. As Purcell and Weiss (1970) concluded in their review, "it appears accurate to state that, with either animals or human beings, the successful conditioning of asthma remains to be demonstrated, even in the opinion of those investigations whose original positive reports on conditioning are cited frequently" (p. 607).
Asthma is a common disease with a strong genetic component. If you have two asthmatic parents, your chances of developing asthma are about 1 in 2. Asthmatics react to various allergens and to infections of the upper respiratory system. In the 1930's, under the influence of Freud's batty ideas, many people claimed asthma was due to "separation anxiety", a claim that has since been discredited. Later, it has been claimed by some doctors that asthma was just a conditioned response, but as we have seen, this has not been demonstrated rigorously.
All in all, I am skeptical of the claim that asthmatics sneeze at plastic flowers. Even if it were true, I don't see how it supports the claim that the mind is "immaterial". I know very little about neuroscience, but it doesn't seem that farfetched to me that an neural network could, after repeated stimulation, associate some autonomic response such as sneezing, with some visual stimulation. No supernatural explanation seems to be required.
Our House on TV
The CTV show Dan for Mayor is filmed in Kitchener, Ontario, where I normally live. (This year I'm on sabbatical at MIT.)
I don't find the show particularly funny, but I have a soft spot for it, because last fall they filmed on our street. In Season 1, Episode 2, you can see the interior of our house. If you're in Canada, you can watch it on the CTV web site, but elsewhere you can buy it from the Itunes store or brave Megavideo. Our house appears about the 9 minute mark. Here's a screenshot:
Oddly enough, where we're temporarily living, in Newton, MA, another TV show was filmed just around the corner: a pilot for a CBS show called "Quinn-tuplets".
Oh, yeah, I forgot to say - that's Carl Zehr, mayor of Kitchener, in the pic above. Too bad we weren't there.
I don't find the show particularly funny, but I have a soft spot for it, because last fall they filmed on our street. In Season 1, Episode 2, you can see the interior of our house. If you're in Canada, you can watch it on the CTV web site, but elsewhere you can buy it from the Itunes store or brave Megavideo. Our house appears about the 9 minute mark. Here's a screenshot:
Oddly enough, where we're temporarily living, in Newton, MA, another TV show was filmed just around the corner: a pilot for a CBS show called "Quinn-tuplets".
Oh, yeah, I forgot to say - that's Carl Zehr, mayor of Kitchener, in the pic above. Too bad we weren't there.
Friday, April 30, 2010
Muddled Thinking about Free Will
Over at his blog, in support of the existence of "free will", David Heddle says (in a comment):
If free will is an illusion, then deterrents are an illusion. How can a deterrent make me choose not to commit a crime, unless I have the facility of choice?
I think this is more muddled thinking about free will. I still don't know what free will is supposed to mean, exactly, and I don't think anyone else does, either.
But, ignoring this, let's address Heddle's claim. Could deterrents work on humans if they have no free will? I think the answer is clearly, yes. Let's pretend that humans are soulless computational machines, shaped by evolution, who act based on a very very very complicated algorithm that takes sensory impressions as inputs and produces actions as outputs. Let's say that this algorithm tends, generally speaking, to try to ensure survival and pleasure and reproduction of the individual. Now the human machine suddenly sees resources, for the taking, that belong to another. The human machine does a cost-benefit analysis to "decide" whether to take the resources or not. In the absence of a known deterrent, such as a dangerous dog or future incarceration, the human machine may decide to take the resource. In the presence of a deterrent, the human machine may make another decision.
How does this involve "free will"? You can call this decision-making "free will" if you like. But then a thermostat has free will, too.
It's not at all surprising to anyone who thinks about computation for a living that a complicated algorithm can result in different behavior based on different inputs. The mystery to me is why Heddle thinks this says anything about free will.
If free will is an illusion, then deterrents are an illusion. How can a deterrent make me choose not to commit a crime, unless I have the facility of choice?
I think this is more muddled thinking about free will. I still don't know what free will is supposed to mean, exactly, and I don't think anyone else does, either.
But, ignoring this, let's address Heddle's claim. Could deterrents work on humans if they have no free will? I think the answer is clearly, yes. Let's pretend that humans are soulless computational machines, shaped by evolution, who act based on a very very very complicated algorithm that takes sensory impressions as inputs and produces actions as outputs. Let's say that this algorithm tends, generally speaking, to try to ensure survival and pleasure and reproduction of the individual. Now the human machine suddenly sees resources, for the taking, that belong to another. The human machine does a cost-benefit analysis to "decide" whether to take the resources or not. In the absence of a known deterrent, such as a dangerous dog or future incarceration, the human machine may decide to take the resource. In the presence of a deterrent, the human machine may make another decision.
How does this involve "free will"? You can call this decision-making "free will" if you like. But then a thermostat has free will, too.
It's not at all surprising to anyone who thinks about computation for a living that a complicated algorithm can result in different behavior based on different inputs. The mystery to me is why Heddle thinks this says anything about free will.
Beg the Question
Here's a great post about the phrase "beg the question", it history, and what to do about its misuse.
Authoritarian High School Superintendent of the Month
This month's Authoritarianism Award goes to Ricky Clapton, superintendent of the Copiah County schools in Hazlehurst, Mississippi. Mr. Clapton erased a student from her class yearbook. And what was her offense? Did she murder someone, or cheat on her final exams? No. She wore a tuxedo instead of a dress.
When asked about it, Mr. Clapton retreated behind legalese, saying "We have had our legal counsel research the validity of the position of the School District on this matter.. We are informed by counsel that this exact issue has been litigated in federal court. The decisions of the federal courts completely support the policy of the district in this regard. It is the desire of the Copiah County School District to inform, first, the patrons of the district, and second, all other interested parties, that its position is not arbitrary, capricious or unlawful, but is based upon sound educational policy and legal precedent."
Horseshit.
Congratulations, Mr. Clapton. Your award is well-deserved.
When asked about it, Mr. Clapton retreated behind legalese, saying "We have had our legal counsel research the validity of the position of the School District on this matter.. We are informed by counsel that this exact issue has been litigated in federal court. The decisions of the federal courts completely support the policy of the district in this regard. It is the desire of the Copiah County School District to inform, first, the patrons of the district, and second, all other interested parties, that its position is not arbitrary, capricious or unlawful, but is based upon sound educational policy and legal precedent."
Horseshit.
Congratulations, Mr. Clapton. Your award is well-deserved.
Monday, April 26, 2010
LaTeX Search Tool
Well, this doesn't do exactly what I'd want - but latexsearch is at least a start to making mathematical equations searchable.
Monday, April 19, 2010
Boston Marathon!
The Boston Marathon went by on Commonwealth Avenue, just a few blocks away from where I'm living in Newton. We watched at about mile 20 of the course, at the start of the infamous Newton hills, the most famous of which is called "Heartbreak Hill".
Here are a few pictures:
Above: Teyba Erkesso, the top woman finisher, from Ethiopia, all alone with a very substantial lead near mile 20. She would fade and still win, but only by a few seconds.
Above: Robert Cheruiyot (#6) and Deriba Merga (#1) duelling near mile 20. Cheruiyot would win in 2:05:52, a minute and a half ahead of his nearest competitor.
Wheelchair marathoners near mile 20: In the front, from left to right: Kota Hokinoue of Japan (finished 3rd); Soejima Masazumi of Japan (finished 4th); Ernst van Dyk of South Africa (the winner). In the back: Roger Puigbo of Spain (finished 5th) and Kriga Schabort of the USA (finished 2nd).
Here are a few pictures:
Above: Teyba Erkesso, the top woman finisher, from Ethiopia, all alone with a very substantial lead near mile 20. She would fade and still win, but only by a few seconds.
Above: Robert Cheruiyot (#6) and Deriba Merga (#1) duelling near mile 20. Cheruiyot would win in 2:05:52, a minute and a half ahead of his nearest competitor.
Wheelchair marathoners near mile 20: In the front, from left to right: Kota Hokinoue of Japan (finished 3rd); Soejima Masazumi of Japan (finished 4th); Ernst van Dyk of South Africa (the winner). In the back: Roger Puigbo of Spain (finished 5th) and Kriga Schabort of the USA (finished 2nd).
Monday, April 12, 2010
Biblical Mathematics
For a good laugh, look at this website, which claims to find the values of the mathematical constants π = 3.14159... and e = 2.71828 ... hidden in the bible.
Needless to say, such numerology is not considered very highly by most mathematicians. It depends too much on the choice of passage, and the method of calculation. In this page, the author decides that the proper measure is the number of letters times the product of the letters divided by the number of words times the product of the words, but on what basis? And even then, he must remove powers of 10 to get his desired result, and cheat in other ways, such as considering a comma as a letter for one calculation, but not another.
Sad to say, this kind of foolishness is the one area where devout Jews and Muslims find agreement. Numerology has wide currency among many Jewish people, where it is called gematria, and among Muslims such as Louis Farrakhan, who says things like, "What is so deep about this number 19? Why are we standing on the Capitol steps today? That number 19 -- when you have a nine you have a womb that is pregnant. And when you have a one standing by the nine, it means that there's something secret that has to be unfolded."
Needless to say, such numerology is not considered very highly by most mathematicians. It depends too much on the choice of passage, and the method of calculation. In this page, the author decides that the proper measure is the number of letters times the product of the letters divided by the number of words times the product of the words, but on what basis? And even then, he must remove powers of 10 to get his desired result, and cheat in other ways, such as considering a comma as a letter for one calculation, but not another.
Sad to say, this kind of foolishness is the one area where devout Jews and Muslims find agreement. Numerology has wide currency among many Jewish people, where it is called gematria, and among Muslims such as Louis Farrakhan, who says things like, "What is so deep about this number 19? Why are we standing on the Capitol steps today? That number 19 -- when you have a nine you have a womb that is pregnant. And when you have a one standing by the nine, it means that there's something secret that has to be unfolded."
Tuesday, April 06, 2010
Jesus Off Limits for Criticism
Here's a laughable press release from a Christian group that claims "Blasphemy does not qualify as free speech".
They're wrong. It does.
They go on to claim, "Gallaudet University has no right to harm and slander the spotless reputation of the God-Man with blasphemy".
They're wrong. It does.
Look for more and more demands from fundamentalist believers of all religions that criticism of their beliefs be outlawed.
They're wrong. It does.
They go on to claim, "Gallaudet University has no right to harm and slander the spotless reputation of the God-Man with blasphemy".
They're wrong. It does.
Look for more and more demands from fundamentalist believers of all religions that criticism of their beliefs be outlawed.
Saturday, April 03, 2010
Ignoramus of the Month: Denyse O'Leary
Not all intelligent design advocates are dishonest. Some of them are merely ignorant, abysmally ignorant, pig-stupefyingly-ignorant of the theory they criticize.
Example: here is Canadian "journalist" Denyse O'Leary describing her understanding of evolution:
So the claim is, "changed shape, changed size, changed metabolism and changed food source. How much more MACRO do you expect an organism to evolve?"
Hmmmm. Kittens do this all the time.
Change size? You bet. Goes from a couple of ounces to five lbs in half a year.
Confusing development of an individual with evolution in a population? That's a misconception about evolution that is usually ironed out in high school. Looks like Denyse was absent that day. I'd blame Pokemon, but I think Denyse is far too ancient for that.
Denyse O'Leary: our ignoramus of the month.
Update: O'Leary's posting was apparently too stupid even for her. It now seems to have disappeared from her website.
Further update: it's now back here.
Example: here is Canadian "journalist" Denyse O'Leary describing her understanding of evolution:
So the claim is, "changed shape, changed size, changed metabolism and changed food source. How much more MACRO do you expect an organism to evolve?"
Hmmmm. Kittens do this all the time.
Change size? You bet. Goes from a couple of ounces to five lbs in half a year.
Confusing development of an individual with evolution in a population? That's a misconception about evolution that is usually ironed out in high school. Looks like Denyse was absent that day. I'd blame Pokemon, but I think Denyse is far too ancient for that.
Denyse O'Leary: our ignoramus of the month.
Update: O'Leary's posting was apparently too stupid even for her. It now seems to have disappeared from her website.
Further update: it's now back here.
Thursday, April 01, 2010
My Sabbatical Project
Now that the contract has finally been signed, I can reveal my sabbatical project:
Oxford University Press will be publishing my latest book, An Introduction to the Theory of Numbers and Zombies. This is a revised edition of the classic text of Hardy and Wright, modified to include new results in algebraic number theory and zombiosis. I am particularly proud of the new chapter that discusses Wiles' proof of Fermat's last theorem, which has a short section mentioning how Wiles was able to defend himself from a zombified Ken Ribet using the Tate module and a meat cleaver.
This is just one of a series of new editions of classic mathematical books that have been updated for the 21st century. I am really looking forward to the updated version of Constance's Reid's book, entitled David Hilbert: Vampire Slayer.
(Hat tip: A. L. and A. S. for the graphic.)
Oxford University Press will be publishing my latest book, An Introduction to the Theory of Numbers and Zombies. This is a revised edition of the classic text of Hardy and Wright, modified to include new results in algebraic number theory and zombiosis. I am particularly proud of the new chapter that discusses Wiles' proof of Fermat's last theorem, which has a short section mentioning how Wiles was able to defend himself from a zombified Ken Ribet using the Tate module and a meat cleaver.
This is just one of a series of new editions of classic mathematical books that have been updated for the 21st century. I am really looking forward to the updated version of Constance's Reid's book, entitled David Hilbert: Vampire Slayer.
(Hat tip: A. L. and A. S. for the graphic.)
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Alan Cobham
Alan Belmont Cobham (b. November 4 1927, San Francisco) is a mathematician and theoretical computer scientist. He was an undergraduate at Oberlin College and the University of Chicago, and later went on to do graduate work at both Berkeley and MIT, although he never got a Ph. D. He worked at IBM Yorktown Heights, and for a while was chair of the computer science department at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut. He still lives in Middletown. I recently had a chance to talk briefly with Alan Cobham at his home, and took the picture above.
He is known for several achievements. He was one of the first people to bring attention to the complexity class P, in a paper entitled "The intrinsic computational difficulty of functions", where he proposed studying the functions computable in polynomial time.
In 1969, he wrote the first of two papers on what are now called "automatic sequences" (he called them "uniform tag sequences"). An automatic sequence (an) is one in which the nth term can be calculated by expressing n in some base k, feeding it into a deterministic finite automaton, and then looking at the state reached at the end. An output function converts the state name into (an). In this paper Cobham proved a subtle and beautiful result: if a sequence is generated by two automata that accept inputs expressed in multiplicatively independent bases, then it is ultimately periodic. There is still no really simple proof of this result.
In 1972, he wrote a very influential paper entitled "Uniform tag sequences", where the theory of automatic sequences was developed in great detail. This paper has led to hundreds of others exploring the theory of automatic sequences and generalizing them.
I Won't Be Going to This Cafe
Two women sharing a kiss got told off by the owner of the 1842 Cafe in Waterloo, Ontario. Well, I guess I won't be buying anything from that place when I return to KW from my sabbatical.
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
Protons, Proteins - What's the Difference?
NPR's science reporter Nell Greenfieldboyce just now (2 PM EST, March 30) referred to the Large Hadron Collider sending "beams of proteins whizzing around a 17-mile circular tunnel, then smash[ing] them together at high speed, creating a shower of debris". I sure hope that was just a slip of the tongue. Any science journalist who doesn't know immediately what the difference between a proton and protein is, and why the LHC would be smashing the former and not the latter, doesn't deserve a job.
Economist is the New Messiah, Cult Says
Here's a funny article about Raj Patel, an economist who appeared on the Colbert Report and is now being proclaimed as the new Messiah by a religious cult.
I thought the Brits knew that Eric Clapton is god?
I thought the Brits knew that Eric Clapton is god?
Sunday, March 28, 2010
Freedom of Expression: Canada vs. Texas
The president of Tarleton College in Texas has a stronger commitment to free speech than the vice-president of the University of Ottawa.
This is one of the worst things about living in Canada.
This is one of the worst things about living in Canada.
Friday, March 26, 2010
Mathematical Genealogy
The Mathematics Genealogy Project records Ph. D. mathematicians and their thesis supervisors. Recently they've relaxed the "thesis supervisor" to include advisors of various sorts, which allows them to extend their records back to the Middle Ages.
Of course, I couldn't resist looking at my own record. (It's incomplete; they don't list 2 of my Ph. D. students.) Some of my supervisory ancestors include:
Saunders MacLane - 3
Hermann Weyl - 4
David Hilbert - 5
Felix Klein, Georg Frobenius, Lindemann - 6
Kummer, Weierstrass - 7
Jacobi, Dirichlet - 8
Fourier - 9
Gauss, Lagrange, Laplace - 10
Euler - 11
Leibniz - 14
Huygens - 15
Mersenne - 17
Copernicus - 23
Here the numbers indicate the number of links it takes to get to that person. Assuming that each student has shaken the hand of their supervisor, I find it neat to think that only 23 handshakes separate me from Copernicus. Of course, I'm not very special in this regard, as lots and lots of mathematicians have illustrious forbears. The database, for example, currently lists 53,775 descendants for Copernicus, or about 38% of all the people listed.
My wife's tree might even be more prestigious. She's got Newton at level 14, and Galileo at 17.
Of course, I couldn't resist looking at my own record. (It's incomplete; they don't list 2 of my Ph. D. students.) Some of my supervisory ancestors include:
Saunders MacLane - 3
Hermann Weyl - 4
David Hilbert - 5
Felix Klein, Georg Frobenius, Lindemann - 6
Kummer, Weierstrass - 7
Jacobi, Dirichlet - 8
Fourier - 9
Gauss, Lagrange, Laplace - 10
Euler - 11
Leibniz - 14
Huygens - 15
Mersenne - 17
Copernicus - 23
Here the numbers indicate the number of links it takes to get to that person. Assuming that each student has shaken the hand of their supervisor, I find it neat to think that only 23 handshakes separate me from Copernicus. Of course, I'm not very special in this regard, as lots and lots of mathematicians have illustrious forbears. The database, for example, currently lists 53,775 descendants for Copernicus, or about 38% of all the people listed.
My wife's tree might even be more prestigious. She's got Newton at level 14, and Galileo at 17.
Thursday, March 25, 2010
Everything in its Proper Place
Tony McManus sent along this picture from the Chapters bookstore in Waterloo, Ontario, showing that at least some bookstores recognize a charade when they see one.
Monday, March 22, 2010
Take That, Bob Dylan!
I had a nice time with Celtic guitar superstar Tony McManus last night. Tony revealed that two of his pieces will be in the new Neil Jordan film, Ondine.
He also told the following story: a guitarist he knew recently died and was buried in a Jewish cemetery in Newton. His epitaph reads, "Times were sometimes tough, but at least I never made a Christmas album."
He also told the following story: a guitarist he knew recently died and was buried in a Jewish cemetery in Newton. His epitaph reads, "Times were sometimes tough, but at least I never made a Christmas album."
Boehner's Ridiculous Rhetoric
I have mixed feelings about the healthcare bill, but Boehner's hyperbolic rhetoric on the House floor last night was simply ridiculous:
"Today we stand here amidst the wreckage of what was once the respect and honor that this House was held in by our fellow citizens."
And just when was the House viewed with "respect" and "honor"? Was it when Joe Wilson yelled "you lie!" during Obama's speech? Or, for a bipartisan example, was it when disgraced federal judge Alcee Hastings was elected to that august body?
"We have failed to reflect the will of our constituents."
Duh - there's a reason why we elect our representatives instead of deciding everything by referendum. It's so that our representatives can do what they think is right, not what will appeal to the emotions of the moment. Besides, polls show wide support for the main provisions, even if people think they oppose the bill as a whole.
"They’re disgusted, because they see one political party closing out the other from what should be a national solution."
Actually, the bill had over 200 Republican amendments. It's not the Democrats' fault if the Republicans are bent on opposition and obstruction at all costs.
"Around this chamber, looking upon us are the lawgivers – from Moses to Gaius, to Blackstone, to Thomas Jefferson.
By our action today, we disgrace their values.
We break the ties of history."
Providing healthcare to more people disgraces the values of Moses? Who knew?
"It is not too late to begin to restore the bonds of trust with our Nation and return comity to this institution."
Yeah, and it's not too late for Republicans - like Randy Neugebauer (R-Texas) - to stop yelling "baby killer" at Stupak.
"Today we stand here amidst the wreckage of what was once the respect and honor that this House was held in by our fellow citizens."
And just when was the House viewed with "respect" and "honor"? Was it when Joe Wilson yelled "you lie!" during Obama's speech? Or, for a bipartisan example, was it when disgraced federal judge Alcee Hastings was elected to that august body?
"We have failed to reflect the will of our constituents."
Duh - there's a reason why we elect our representatives instead of deciding everything by referendum. It's so that our representatives can do what they think is right, not what will appeal to the emotions of the moment. Besides, polls show wide support for the main provisions, even if people think they oppose the bill as a whole.
"They’re disgusted, because they see one political party closing out the other from what should be a national solution."
Actually, the bill had over 200 Republican amendments. It's not the Democrats' fault if the Republicans are bent on opposition and obstruction at all costs.
"Around this chamber, looking upon us are the lawgivers – from Moses to Gaius, to Blackstone, to Thomas Jefferson.
By our action today, we disgrace their values.
We break the ties of history."
Providing healthcare to more people disgraces the values of Moses? Who knew?
"It is not too late to begin to restore the bonds of trust with our Nation and return comity to this institution."
Yeah, and it's not too late for Republicans - like Randy Neugebauer (R-Texas) - to stop yelling "baby killer" at Stupak.
Saturday, March 20, 2010
When to Doubt the Science Bashers
Former DI flack Jay Richards has a piece over at the American Enterprise's "journal", giving 12 reasons why you should stick your fingers in your ears and say "Na, na, I can't hear you!" when there is strong scientific consensus. So, in the spirit of that piece, let me offer a few reasons why you should doubt the doubters:
1. When the deniers have little or no scientific training. Richards has "a B.A. with majors in Political Science and Religion, an M.Div. (Master of Divinity) and a Th.M. (Master of Theology), and a Ph.D. (with honors) in philosophy and theology from Princeton Theological Seminary."
2. When the deniers worked for groups, such as the Discovery Institute, who have a history of prevaricating, dissembling, and just flat out lying.
3. When the deniers publish their supposedly scientific books with publishers devoted to far-right political screeds.
4. When the deniers have held appointments at so-called universities that advertise "biblically centered education" and offer courses in scientific apologetics designed to "demonstrate the harmony between science and a biblical worldview".
5. When the deniers claim that the very existence of a scientific consensus is a reason to doubt the consensus.
6. When the deniers are well-funded by groups that stand to lose a lot of money when action is finally taken.
7. When the deniers post their claims on web pages that don't allow comments.
8. And finally, when the evidence is strongly against the deniers.
1. When the deniers have little or no scientific training. Richards has "a B.A. with majors in Political Science and Religion, an M.Div. (Master of Divinity) and a Th.M. (Master of Theology), and a Ph.D. (with honors) in philosophy and theology from Princeton Theological Seminary."
2. When the deniers worked for groups, such as the Discovery Institute, who have a history of prevaricating, dissembling, and just flat out lying.
3. When the deniers publish their supposedly scientific books with publishers devoted to far-right political screeds.
4. When the deniers have held appointments at so-called universities that advertise "biblically centered education" and offer courses in scientific apologetics designed to "demonstrate the harmony between science and a biblical worldview".
5. When the deniers claim that the very existence of a scientific consensus is a reason to doubt the consensus.
6. When the deniers are well-funded by groups that stand to lose a lot of money when action is finally taken.
7. When the deniers post their claims on web pages that don't allow comments.
8. And finally, when the evidence is strongly against the deniers.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Turkey!
This is the turkey I met walking down the street today - here in Newton, Massachusetts, a suburb of Boston. Any resemblance to a Discovery Institute fellow is purely coincidental.
The 2010 Bernoulli Trials
Here's a copy of the 2010 Bernoulli trials, a contest held annually at the University of Waterloo and open to all undergraduates. The students were given 13 statements and had to decide the truth or falsity of each one. Two incorrect answers and you're out. (For some previous years, see here.)
I like many of these questions, and a couple of them made me think for a while. How many can you do? Go ahead and post solutions in the comments, if you feel like it.
I like many of these questions, and a couple of them made me think for a while. How many can you do? Go ahead and post solutions in the comments, if you feel like it.
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Loftus vs. Wood: An Atheist-Theist Debate
Here's a link to a debate entitled "Does God Exist?", featuring David Wood (theist) versus John Loftus (atheist).
I wasn't impressed at all with Wood's argument, which went roughly as follows:
1. He claimed that "Atheists have held that the Universe is eternal ... Much to the horror of atheists, research in the 20th century showed that the Universe is expanding, and we can therefore trace its development back to a beginning."
I think this misrepresents the case. Some physicists supported a steady-state universe (and some few still do), and some opposed it. But I see no evidence that atheists came down overwhelmingly on one side or the other. And I see no evidence today that atheists regard the Big Bang theory with "horror". Why should we? The Big Bang doesn't imply a magical creator.
2. He claimed that "Either the Universe began to exist as the result of some cause, or the Universe sprang into existence uncaused. The second alternative is obviously absurd - out of nothing, nothing comes."
Not much of an argument. First, we see apparently uncaused events all the time in radioactive decay. When a particular Americium atom decays in your smoke detector, what causes that one to decay rather than some other one? Nothing that we know. Second, even in a vacuum, virtual particles come into existence all the time and are measurable. So appealing to naive folk wisdom like "out of nothing, nothing comes" when modern physics contradicts this --- it's not intellectually honest.
3. He gave an argument about fine tuning. "These numbers [constants of physics] could have had a wide range of values, and yet the values they actually have fall into the extremely narrow range that makes biological life possible."
How does Wood know that the constants of physics "could have had a wide range of values"? Answer: he doesn't - it's just an assertion. Maybe because of something about physics we don't know, only a narrow range of constants is possible.
How does Wood know that tweaking the constants would usually result in an unlivable universe? Answer: he doesn't. Vic Stenger has modeled universes where the constants can change, and found that a relatively wide range of constants still allowed interesting physics.
How does Wood know that tweaking the constants couldn't result in some other completely different form of life? Answer: he doesn't.
4. He argued that the complexity of biology implies a Designer: "Where did Earth's diverse biological complexity come from? The most obvious explanation is design."
Yes, that may have been true before 1859, back in the day when our ideas about biology were so primitive that many physicians rejected the germ theory of disease. But a lot has happened since then, much of it due to another D-word: Darwin. We now have a strongly-supported theory that can account for biological complexity -- the theory of evolution -- so to pretend that we must stick with the "obvious explanation" 150 years later is dishonest.
5. He claimed that consciousness requires a "soul". "I can have a thought about a grilled cheese sandwich - I can't have a pattern of molecules about a grilled cheese sandwich".
Why not? I see no logical or physical problem in maintaining that I can have a thought about a grilled cheese sandwich and that this thought ultimately reduces to matter and energy in my brain. Much of Wood's argument seemed like this: pure assertion.
"If a scientist examines my brain he might learn all kind of things about my brain that I don't know, but he'll never learn more about my mind than I know."
Why not? What logical or scientific principle would prevent us, for example, from being able to access the subconscious through a physical examination of the brain, resulting in knowledge of (say) a repressed memory that you don't "know" consciously?
6. "We know scientifically that the mind can function even when the brain stops working. There are numerous cases in medical journals of people who are clinically dead, showing no brain activity at all, being brought back to life and reporting that they had conscious experiences while they were dead."
Near-death experiences typically occur during medical crises, when (for example) the brain might be starved of oxygen. If we don't consider the testimony of drunk people reliable, why should we consider the testimony of oxygen-starved brains as reliable? Claims about near-death experiences have been exaggerated and research has been plagued by poor experiment design; see the chapter by Hövelmann in the Skeptic's Handbook of Parapsychology.
7. Naturalism must be able to account for the coherence of human reason: "According to John, our ability to reason is the product of natural selection acting on random mutation ... Does this give us any basis for trusting our reasoning ability when it comes to questions of theology or philosophy or science?"
Here he's stealing - without attribution - C. S. Lewis's argument against naturalism, which has also been argued by Plantinga and others. I find this argument one of the dumbest around. Study after study shows that humans are not always good reasoners: we routinely mishandle basic probability, we make snap judgments based on appearances, and we have unconscious biases. But there's also good empirical evidence (like the existence of spaceships and toasters) that we somehow manage to muddle along and figure things out much of the time. We're simply stuck with the reasoning ability we have, and the heuristics -- known as science -- we've deduced over thousands of years to make sure that our conclusions are correct. It's not like religion comes up with conclusions that we can have confidence in. Which would give you more confidence in a plane never flown in the air before: calculations and simulations by trained engineers, or the blessing of a priest?
8. "Our reasoning is governed by certain logical truths ... we are presupposing that there are logical absolutes - rules of reasoning that cannot be violated... A statement cannot be both true and false at the same time. But what are logical laws? They are not material objects. We don't learn about them through the senses... Logical laws don't depend on human minds. The law of non-contradiction was true before there were any human beings, and if all human beings died tomorrow they would still be true. In fact, the laws of logic would be true in any universe, not just ours. So the laws of logic transcend time, space, matter, and all human minds - they're invariant, unchanging, and eternal."
Spoken by someone who has clearly never heard of multi-valued logic. And is the axiom of choice true or false? When Wood says "the laws of logic would be true in any universe, not just ours", how does he know this? Does he have intimate knowledge of other universes?
In the clever words of philosopher Tim Kenyon, there aren't laws of thought. It's more like "municipal by-laws" of thought.
I might add that Wood gave us no reason to believe that there aren't multiple gods, or even infinitely many.
Unfortunately, Loftus' performance was not very impressive either. Although he made a lot of good points, he read his opening presentation from notes, mumbled too much, stumbled over pronunciations (like "plate tectonics"), made too many joking asides that weren't funny and chuckled at them, sounded a bit patronizing, didn't really connect with the audience, and didn't consistently offer strong rebuttals to Wood's points.
I wasn't impressed at all with Wood's argument, which went roughly as follows:
1. He claimed that "Atheists have held that the Universe is eternal ... Much to the horror of atheists, research in the 20th century showed that the Universe is expanding, and we can therefore trace its development back to a beginning."
I think this misrepresents the case. Some physicists supported a steady-state universe (and some few still do), and some opposed it. But I see no evidence that atheists came down overwhelmingly on one side or the other. And I see no evidence today that atheists regard the Big Bang theory with "horror". Why should we? The Big Bang doesn't imply a magical creator.
2. He claimed that "Either the Universe began to exist as the result of some cause, or the Universe sprang into existence uncaused. The second alternative is obviously absurd - out of nothing, nothing comes."
Not much of an argument. First, we see apparently uncaused events all the time in radioactive decay. When a particular Americium atom decays in your smoke detector, what causes that one to decay rather than some other one? Nothing that we know. Second, even in a vacuum, virtual particles come into existence all the time and are measurable. So appealing to naive folk wisdom like "out of nothing, nothing comes" when modern physics contradicts this --- it's not intellectually honest.
3. He gave an argument about fine tuning. "These numbers [constants of physics] could have had a wide range of values, and yet the values they actually have fall into the extremely narrow range that makes biological life possible."
How does Wood know that the constants of physics "could have had a wide range of values"? Answer: he doesn't - it's just an assertion. Maybe because of something about physics we don't know, only a narrow range of constants is possible.
How does Wood know that tweaking the constants would usually result in an unlivable universe? Answer: he doesn't. Vic Stenger has modeled universes where the constants can change, and found that a relatively wide range of constants still allowed interesting physics.
How does Wood know that tweaking the constants couldn't result in some other completely different form of life? Answer: he doesn't.
4. He argued that the complexity of biology implies a Designer: "Where did Earth's diverse biological complexity come from? The most obvious explanation is design."
Yes, that may have been true before 1859, back in the day when our ideas about biology were so primitive that many physicians rejected the germ theory of disease. But a lot has happened since then, much of it due to another D-word: Darwin. We now have a strongly-supported theory that can account for biological complexity -- the theory of evolution -- so to pretend that we must stick with the "obvious explanation" 150 years later is dishonest.
5. He claimed that consciousness requires a "soul". "I can have a thought about a grilled cheese sandwich - I can't have a pattern of molecules about a grilled cheese sandwich".
Why not? I see no logical or physical problem in maintaining that I can have a thought about a grilled cheese sandwich and that this thought ultimately reduces to matter and energy in my brain. Much of Wood's argument seemed like this: pure assertion.
"If a scientist examines my brain he might learn all kind of things about my brain that I don't know, but he'll never learn more about my mind than I know."
Why not? What logical or scientific principle would prevent us, for example, from being able to access the subconscious through a physical examination of the brain, resulting in knowledge of (say) a repressed memory that you don't "know" consciously?
6. "We know scientifically that the mind can function even when the brain stops working. There are numerous cases in medical journals of people who are clinically dead, showing no brain activity at all, being brought back to life and reporting that they had conscious experiences while they were dead."
Near-death experiences typically occur during medical crises, when (for example) the brain might be starved of oxygen. If we don't consider the testimony of drunk people reliable, why should we consider the testimony of oxygen-starved brains as reliable? Claims about near-death experiences have been exaggerated and research has been plagued by poor experiment design; see the chapter by Hövelmann in the Skeptic's Handbook of Parapsychology.
7. Naturalism must be able to account for the coherence of human reason: "According to John, our ability to reason is the product of natural selection acting on random mutation ... Does this give us any basis for trusting our reasoning ability when it comes to questions of theology or philosophy or science?"
Here he's stealing - without attribution - C. S. Lewis's argument against naturalism, which has also been argued by Plantinga and others. I find this argument one of the dumbest around. Study after study shows that humans are not always good reasoners: we routinely mishandle basic probability, we make snap judgments based on appearances, and we have unconscious biases. But there's also good empirical evidence (like the existence of spaceships and toasters) that we somehow manage to muddle along and figure things out much of the time. We're simply stuck with the reasoning ability we have, and the heuristics -- known as science -- we've deduced over thousands of years to make sure that our conclusions are correct. It's not like religion comes up with conclusions that we can have confidence in. Which would give you more confidence in a plane never flown in the air before: calculations and simulations by trained engineers, or the blessing of a priest?
8. "Our reasoning is governed by certain logical truths ... we are presupposing that there are logical absolutes - rules of reasoning that cannot be violated... A statement cannot be both true and false at the same time. But what are logical laws? They are not material objects. We don't learn about them through the senses... Logical laws don't depend on human minds. The law of non-contradiction was true before there were any human beings, and if all human beings died tomorrow they would still be true. In fact, the laws of logic would be true in any universe, not just ours. So the laws of logic transcend time, space, matter, and all human minds - they're invariant, unchanging, and eternal."
Spoken by someone who has clearly never heard of multi-valued logic. And is the axiom of choice true or false? When Wood says "the laws of logic would be true in any universe, not just ours", how does he know this? Does he have intimate knowledge of other universes?
In the clever words of philosopher Tim Kenyon, there aren't laws of thought. It's more like "municipal by-laws" of thought.
I might add that Wood gave us no reason to believe that there aren't multiple gods, or even infinitely many.
Unfortunately, Loftus' performance was not very impressive either. Although he made a lot of good points, he read his opening presentation from notes, mumbled too much, stumbled over pronunciations (like "plate tectonics"), made too many joking asides that weren't funny and chuckled at them, sounded a bit patronizing, didn't really connect with the audience, and didn't consistently offer strong rebuttals to Wood's points.
Saturday, March 13, 2010
Don't Cite Works You Haven't Read
It's something you teach your graduate students: Don't cite works you haven't read.
It's a rule with good reasons behind it. First, it's a bad idea to rely on someone else's summary of another work. Maybe they summarized it incorrectly, or maybe there is more there you need to consider. Second, as a scholar, it's your obligation not to spread misinformation. Maybe the page numbers or the volume are given incorrectly.
Like all rules, there are occasional exceptions. Maybe it's a really old and obscure work that you've tried to get a copy of, but failed. In that case, you can cite the work but mention that you haven't actually been able to find a copy. (I've done this.) That way, at the least the reader will be warned that you're relying on someone else's citation.
And now, from Paris, comes a spectacular case of why citing works you haven't read is a bad idea. The French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévi has been caught citing and praising, in his new book De la guerre en philosophie, the work of the philosopher "Jean-Baptiste Botul". Only problem? Botul doesn't actually exist. He is the creation of journalist Frédéric Pagès.
Now, maybe Lévy did actually read Botul's book La vie sexuelle d'Emmanuel Kant. But if so, despite the big warning signs (Botul's school is called "Botulism") he failed to recognize it as a big joke, which raises even more questions about his perspicacity.
Maybe I need to tell my graduate students another rule: Don't cite works that you suspect may be a hoax.
Oh, and for the record? I haven't read Lévi's new book, nor Pagès's satire.
It's a rule with good reasons behind it. First, it's a bad idea to rely on someone else's summary of another work. Maybe they summarized it incorrectly, or maybe there is more there you need to consider. Second, as a scholar, it's your obligation not to spread misinformation. Maybe the page numbers or the volume are given incorrectly.
Like all rules, there are occasional exceptions. Maybe it's a really old and obscure work that you've tried to get a copy of, but failed. In that case, you can cite the work but mention that you haven't actually been able to find a copy. (I've done this.) That way, at the least the reader will be warned that you're relying on someone else's citation.
And now, from Paris, comes a spectacular case of why citing works you haven't read is a bad idea. The French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévi has been caught citing and praising, in his new book De la guerre en philosophie, the work of the philosopher "Jean-Baptiste Botul". Only problem? Botul doesn't actually exist. He is the creation of journalist Frédéric Pagès.
Now, maybe Lévy did actually read Botul's book La vie sexuelle d'Emmanuel Kant. But if so, despite the big warning signs (Botul's school is called "Botulism") he failed to recognize it as a big joke, which raises even more questions about his perspicacity.
Maybe I need to tell my graduate students another rule: Don't cite works that you suspect may be a hoax.
Oh, and for the record? I haven't read Lévi's new book, nor Pagès's satire.
Friday, March 12, 2010
Reply to Paul Nelson
Glenn Branch has kindly pointed out that Paul Nelson thinks that my counterexample to the claims in Meyer's Signature in the Cell is a "fluffy confection" and "sophistry".
Recall that Meyer claimed that only minds can create information. I gave a simple counterexample: weather prediction. Meteorologists gather the information needed to make their predictions from the natural world - things like wind speed, wind direction, temperature, and so forth - and then use this information to make their predictions. Nelson is unconvinced. But his reply is unconvincing.
Nelson starts by claiming that you can't determine quantities like barometric pressure and temperature without looking at a measuring instrument. This is both (a) false and (b) not relevant. Nelson must spend all his time indoors, because I can (and do all the time) estimate the temperature quite accurately (typically within 2-3 degrees C) just by sticking my head out the door.
Next, Nelson claims that you can't predict the weather accurately without a complex analytical model. Again, this is both (a) false and (b) not relevant. Even the boy scout manual gives some basic techniques that can be understood by teenagers.
Nelson also fails to recognize that answering a simple question like "Is it warm enough to go around without a coat?" gives you information about the weather. If the answer is yes, you can be pretty damn sure that it is not going to snow in the next hour. That's not a lot of information, perhaps, but it certainly constitutes information.
Third, Nelson claims that "there is complexity aplenty in the data, but, as SITC explains, that complexity is unspecified". This is the standard creationist ploy: admit that weather observations constitute "information", but just claim it is not the right kind of information. Never mind that this "right kind of information" is not recognized by anybody who actually studies information theory for a living - we should listen to Nelson because of his great credentials in mathematics.
However, weather observations do constitute information according to Meyer's own definition in Signature in the Cell, because these data are images of the underlying physical systems that cause the weather.
Finally, Nelson claims that the raw data (which he claims is not "specified information") suddenly becomes "specified" after it passes through an algorithm that does weather prediction. Nelson scores it in his own goal, because according to Dembski, computer algorithms cannot produce specified complexity. Even if Nelson is going to claim that the "specification" is contained in the algorithm, that doesn't explain how weather prediction algorithms can go on, day after day, producing weather forecast after weather forecast, each forecast with its own new amount of "specified information", from only the input data and a finite program.
Nelson's response is completely without merit. Look for more similar creationist attacks in the future, because this simple example of weather prediction is so devastating to their bogus claims.
Recall that Meyer claimed that only minds can create information. I gave a simple counterexample: weather prediction. Meteorologists gather the information needed to make their predictions from the natural world - things like wind speed, wind direction, temperature, and so forth - and then use this information to make their predictions. Nelson is unconvinced. But his reply is unconvincing.
Nelson starts by claiming that you can't determine quantities like barometric pressure and temperature without looking at a measuring instrument. This is both (a) false and (b) not relevant. Nelson must spend all his time indoors, because I can (and do all the time) estimate the temperature quite accurately (typically within 2-3 degrees C) just by sticking my head out the door.
Next, Nelson claims that you can't predict the weather accurately without a complex analytical model. Again, this is both (a) false and (b) not relevant. Even the boy scout manual gives some basic techniques that can be understood by teenagers.
Nelson also fails to recognize that answering a simple question like "Is it warm enough to go around without a coat?" gives you information about the weather. If the answer is yes, you can be pretty damn sure that it is not going to snow in the next hour. That's not a lot of information, perhaps, but it certainly constitutes information.
Third, Nelson claims that "there is complexity aplenty in the data, but, as SITC explains, that complexity is unspecified". This is the standard creationist ploy: admit that weather observations constitute "information", but just claim it is not the right kind of information. Never mind that this "right kind of information" is not recognized by anybody who actually studies information theory for a living - we should listen to Nelson because of his great credentials in mathematics.
However, weather observations do constitute information according to Meyer's own definition in Signature in the Cell, because these data are images of the underlying physical systems that cause the weather.
Finally, Nelson claims that the raw data (which he claims is not "specified information") suddenly becomes "specified" after it passes through an algorithm that does weather prediction. Nelson scores it in his own goal, because according to Dembski, computer algorithms cannot produce specified complexity. Even if Nelson is going to claim that the "specification" is contained in the algorithm, that doesn't explain how weather prediction algorithms can go on, day after day, producing weather forecast after weather forecast, each forecast with its own new amount of "specified information", from only the input data and a finite program.
Nelson's response is completely without merit. Look for more similar creationist attacks in the future, because this simple example of weather prediction is so devastating to their bogus claims.
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
When Faith Healing Kills
Via Hemant Mehta (the Friendly Atheist), here is the sad story of Neal Beagley, a 16-year-old killed by his parents' failure to seek adequate medical care, and their choice to rely on prayer instead.
Their son died, and the Beagleys have been sentenced to 16 months in jail. Yup, nothing fails like prayer.
I have a slightly different take on the case than Hemant does. I don't see any reason to doubt that the parents were sincere in their beliefs that they were doing what was best for their kid. And we don't always criminalize actions (or failure to act) that result in death: look at all the people that die during surgery - or perhaps, in a better parallel, look at all the people that died in the early history of medicine from the mistaken belief that being "bled" would help cure them. I don't see any "mens rea" in the Beagley case. Stupidity isn't a crime, and the parents have already paid a heavy emotional and genetic penalty for their stupidity.
The real criminals in this case are not the Beagleys, who were just doing what they had been told by authority figures would work. The real criminals are the religious leaders who make the bogus claim that "prayer heals", despite the fact that there is no good evidence that this is the case. Reportedly their church, the Followers of Christ, has a long history of letting children die by treating them with prayer instead of modern medicine.
I'll concede that we need laws against what the Beagleys did -- but purely for their deterrent, and not their punitive value. If people who rely on prayer alone to cure serious illnesses in children know that their failure may result in prison time, maybe they'll be less likely to rely on prayer alone. I'd definitely like to see a repeal of all religiously-based exemptions of child abuse charges for faith-healing deaths.
But more importantly, I'd like to see a law that makes it a crime for someone who is not a medical professional to counsel someone to withhold medical care for seriously ill children where there is a well-established and safe remedy known for the condition. Such a law could be very narrowly written and still have a beneficial effect.
Their son died, and the Beagleys have been sentenced to 16 months in jail. Yup, nothing fails like prayer.
I have a slightly different take on the case than Hemant does. I don't see any reason to doubt that the parents were sincere in their beliefs that they were doing what was best for their kid. And we don't always criminalize actions (or failure to act) that result in death: look at all the people that die during surgery - or perhaps, in a better parallel, look at all the people that died in the early history of medicine from the mistaken belief that being "bled" would help cure them. I don't see any "mens rea" in the Beagley case. Stupidity isn't a crime, and the parents have already paid a heavy emotional and genetic penalty for their stupidity.
The real criminals in this case are not the Beagleys, who were just doing what they had been told by authority figures would work. The real criminals are the religious leaders who make the bogus claim that "prayer heals", despite the fact that there is no good evidence that this is the case. Reportedly their church, the Followers of Christ, has a long history of letting children die by treating them with prayer instead of modern medicine.
I'll concede that we need laws against what the Beagleys did -- but purely for their deterrent, and not their punitive value. If people who rely on prayer alone to cure serious illnesses in children know that their failure may result in prison time, maybe they'll be less likely to rely on prayer alone. I'd definitely like to see a repeal of all religiously-based exemptions of child abuse charges for faith-healing deaths.
But more importantly, I'd like to see a law that makes it a crime for someone who is not a medical professional to counsel someone to withhold medical care for seriously ill children where there is a well-established and safe remedy known for the condition. Such a law could be very narrowly written and still have a beneficial effect.
Monday, March 08, 2010
Looking for an Honest Creationist
There's a new blog, Diogenes' Lamp, that takes on creationism, intelligent design, and similar foolishness. Worth a look - but, like Diogenes, if he's looking for an honest creationist, he's going to have a long wait.
Friday, March 05, 2010
Justice Isn't Blind
The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University has been hosting a really interesting series of talks. Video is available on the internet, too.
Here's one: Leslie Zebrowitz, a professor at Brandeis, has been doing research on how people's appearance governs how they are treated in court. The results are a little scary: if you have a "baby face", you are more likely to win your case in Small Claims Court when you are denying intentional wrongdoing. If the defendant is "maturefaced", and the plaintiff is "babyfaced", the plaintiff is more likely to get larger monetary damages.
This is just one in a series of results showing that people's unconscious biases strongly color their decision-making.
Here's one: Leslie Zebrowitz, a professor at Brandeis, has been doing research on how people's appearance governs how they are treated in court. The results are a little scary: if you have a "baby face", you are more likely to win your case in Small Claims Court when you are denying intentional wrongdoing. If the defendant is "maturefaced", and the plaintiff is "babyfaced", the plaintiff is more likely to get larger monetary damages.
This is just one in a series of results showing that people's unconscious biases strongly color their decision-making.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Solution to the Coin Quiz
I asked, What US coin has the highest value, according to the denomination in numbers (not words) given on it?
To start off with, you need to know that in the early days of US coinage, some coins expressed their value as a fraction of a dollar. For example, here's the reverse of an early half-cent:
See where it says 1/200? That means (1/200)th of a dollar, or half a cent.
Similarly, the old large cents said (1/100) on the reverse, meaning (1/100)th of a dollar.
Except that in 1801 and 1802, somebody wasn't paying attention and didn't engrave the dies properly. So you got some large cents in 1801 and 1802 with the following reverse:
See where it says 1/000 ?!?
So the answer to my quiz is, the largest denomination on any US coin was infinite.
Sorry - but I warned you it was a trick question.
To start off with, you need to know that in the early days of US coinage, some coins expressed their value as a fraction of a dollar. For example, here's the reverse of an early half-cent:
See where it says 1/200? That means (1/200)th of a dollar, or half a cent.
Similarly, the old large cents said (1/100) on the reverse, meaning (1/100)th of a dollar.
Except that in 1801 and 1802, somebody wasn't paying attention and didn't engrave the dies properly. So you got some large cents in 1801 and 1802 with the following reverse:
See where it says 1/000 ?!?
So the answer to my quiz is, the largest denomination on any US coin was infinite.
Sorry - but I warned you it was a trick question.
The Big Beethoven Poll (2nd attempt)
Sorry, I completely messed up the wording for the first poll, so I cancelled it and let's try it again now.
Again, this is in reference to a discussion that ensued in a previous post.
Sorry about the error - it was too early this morning when I filled out the form.
If you voted before, go ahead and vote again.
Again, this is in reference to a discussion that ensued in a previous post.
Sorry about the error - it was too early this morning when I filled out the form.
If you voted before, go ahead and vote again.
It Must be Tough to be a Schlafly
Imagine growing up in a household where Phyllis Schlafly, that hypocritical harridan, was your mother. You'd hear things like "By getting married, the woman has consented to sex, and I don't think you can call it rape". You'd have to live with the contradiction that your mother fought against the Equal Rights Amendment while simultaneously taking advantage of the improvement in women's rights brought about by the people supporting the ERA. Wouldn't it mess with your head?
So I feel sorry for Andy Schlafly, founder of "Conservapedia" (which is to Wikipedia what Fox News is to real news). But that doesn't prevent me from laughing when I read that "conservatism is mostly logic, and ultimately logic prevails". This from the same person who writes things like "conservative insights increase over time at a geometric rate, as in 1-2-4-8-16-etc" and had his butt handed to him by Richard Lenski.
And - only if your irony meter has been recently calibrated - go read the Conservapedia entry on relativity, in which one of the "counterexamples to relativity" is (I kid you not) "The action-at-a-distance by Jesus, described in John 4:46-54". Yup, that's "mostly logic".
So I feel sorry for Andy Schlafly, founder of "Conservapedia" (which is to Wikipedia what Fox News is to real news). But that doesn't prevent me from laughing when I read that "conservatism is mostly logic, and ultimately logic prevails". This from the same person who writes things like "conservative insights increase over time at a geometric rate, as in 1-2-4-8-16-etc" and had his butt handed to him by Richard Lenski.
And - only if your irony meter has been recently calibrated - go read the Conservapedia entry on relativity, in which one of the "counterexamples to relativity" is (I kid you not) "The action-at-a-distance by Jesus, described in John 4:46-54". Yup, that's "mostly logic".
Saturday, February 27, 2010
A Coin Quiz
OK, here's a coin quiz:
What US coin has the highest value, according to the denomination in numbers (not words) given on it?
Yes, it is a trick question - but one a mathematician should appreciate.
Put your guesses in the comments.
For the surprising answer, come back tomorrow.
What US coin has the highest value, according to the denomination in numbers (not words) given on it?
Yes, it is a trick question - but one a mathematician should appreciate.
Put your guesses in the comments.
For the surprising answer, come back tomorrow.
More Anti-Science Stupidity from Non-Scientist
Here is yet another "oh those nasty scientists" rant from the senior managing editor of the New English Review, Rebecca Bynum. Some highlights:
The high priests of scientism, from Stephen Hawking to Richard Dawkins... illustrates one of the most clichéd tropes: castigate scientists by using religious language. Honestly, can't the science haters come up with something new? This one is really getting boring.
For example, science can describe the effects of electricity, but it cannot tell us what electricity is any more than it can tell us what life is or what gravity is. This poor woman obviously did not attend 10th grade science, or she would know that electricity consists of a flow of electrons. And heck - philosophers can't even give a perfect definition of the word "chair", so why should Ms. Bynum expect one for "life"?
And if pattern does not exist in mind or as mind, then where does it exist? Utterly moronic. Pattern exists as a configuration of atoms and molecules. I wonder what she thinks differentiates hexane from dimethylbutane.
Islam is, in essence, an extremely materialistic religion with many similarities to secular materialism: both remove human dignity and envision man as a slave. Right - all the materialists I know are slaves, and no slaves were ever enslaved by Christians.
Language alone, with its well neigh infinite complexity, were it genetically based, would logically require an immense amount of genetic space. And if language cannot be found in our genes, how could art or culture be found there?
Ms. Bynum must be horsing around - "well neigh" indeed. And what Ms. Bynum thinks of as "logical" is far from it. She's throwing around terms like "complexity" and "genetic space" with no understanding.
Ms. Bynum's real beef is that science has shown that man is an insignificant speck in an enormously large universe. Man is the product of evolution from those inferior "animals". Them's the facts, Ma'am, and none of your agonizing is going to change them. It's time to grow up.
The high priests of scientism, from Stephen Hawking to Richard Dawkins... illustrates one of the most clichéd tropes: castigate scientists by using religious language. Honestly, can't the science haters come up with something new? This one is really getting boring.
For example, science can describe the effects of electricity, but it cannot tell us what electricity is any more than it can tell us what life is or what gravity is. This poor woman obviously did not attend 10th grade science, or she would know that electricity consists of a flow of electrons. And heck - philosophers can't even give a perfect definition of the word "chair", so why should Ms. Bynum expect one for "life"?
And if pattern does not exist in mind or as mind, then where does it exist? Utterly moronic. Pattern exists as a configuration of atoms and molecules. I wonder what she thinks differentiates hexane from dimethylbutane.
Islam is, in essence, an extremely materialistic religion with many similarities to secular materialism: both remove human dignity and envision man as a slave. Right - all the materialists I know are slaves, and no slaves were ever enslaved by Christians.
Language alone, with its well neigh infinite complexity, were it genetically based, would logically require an immense amount of genetic space. And if language cannot be found in our genes, how could art or culture be found there?
Ms. Bynum must be horsing around - "well neigh" indeed. And what Ms. Bynum thinks of as "logical" is far from it. She's throwing around terms like "complexity" and "genetic space" with no understanding.
Ms. Bynum's real beef is that science has shown that man is an insignificant speck in an enormously large universe. Man is the product of evolution from those inferior "animals". Them's the facts, Ma'am, and none of your agonizing is going to change them. It's time to grow up.
Severin Blanchet
Severin Blanchet was a French actor, writer, and filmmaker. He starred in the movie "Jardins en Automne", where he played Vincent, a French cabinet minister who is ousted from his position, loses his wife, but ends up happier for it. Here's the trailer:
He was a member of Les Ateliers Varan, an organization devoted to documentary film, and spent much of his life teaching young people in places like Papua New Guinea how to make their own documentaries. His mother was Narda Blanchet, who had a career in film herself in her old age and just recently passed away.
Severin was my wife's first cousin, once removed, but we never met him. We had just written to him last week to express our condolences on the death of his mother. He had just left Paris for Afghanistan, where he was teaching young Afghans how to make movies.
Severin Blanchet was killed in Kabul, Afghanistan yesterday morning by a suicide bomber.
He was a member of Les Ateliers Varan, an organization devoted to documentary film, and spent much of his life teaching young people in places like Papua New Guinea how to make their own documentaries. His mother was Narda Blanchet, who had a career in film herself in her old age and just recently passed away.
Severin was my wife's first cousin, once removed, but we never met him. We had just written to him last week to express our condolences on the death of his mother. He had just left Paris for Afghanistan, where he was teaching young Afghans how to make movies.
Severin Blanchet was killed in Kabul, Afghanistan yesterday morning by a suicide bomber.
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Stanley Fish is a Moron
Stanley Fish is a moron.
Yes, I know he's a "literary theorist" and "legal scholar" and he has a Ph. D. and wrote 10 books and has a lecture series named after him. But he's still a moron.
Want proof? Read this column in the New York Times. There Professor Fish, favorably quoting a book by Steven Smith, tells us that "secularism" is completely incapable of answering any "real" questions: "...there are no secular reasons, at least not reasons of the kind that could justify a decision to take one course of action rather than another."
So what does Fish think provides these reasons? Why, religion of course.
This argument is so stupid that I find it hard to accept that Fish really believes it. So either he's dishonest (which wouldn't surprise me), or he's a moron. Giving him the benefit of the doubt, the latter option is more palatable.
"Secular" analysis just means thinking about things without relying on religious dogma. When Muslims outlaw interest because their holy book forbids "usury", secular thinkers can point to economic analysis that is noncontroversial outside religious communities: that having money today has value over money ten years from now. When Jehovah's Witnesses prevent their children from having blood transfusions that would save their children's lives because of their interpretation of the Christian bible, secular thinkers can point to the safety of the procedure and the likelihood the child will die without it.
Social science research can reveal aspects of the human character that suggest some ways of structuring our society are better than others. By "better" I mean that they result in happier, prosperous, and freer people, and a more just society. Fish may answer that my devotion to these principles is not "secular". But it clearly is - it is driven by my own self-interest and by principles that are generally accepted, without any reliance on religion or "notions about a purposive cosmos, or a teleological nature". And evolutionary psychology can help explain why people think and act they way they do.
"Secular" analysis doesn't mean all secularists will agree on everything. Some may think (as I do) that a woman's right to autonomy over her own body clearly trumps the right of an embryo to come to term, while others may disagree. But neither do all theists agree: Christians can't even agree on the most basic fact about Christianity, whether good works or faith alone gets you into their heaven. So advancing religion as the answer to ethical quandaries is not in the least helpful.
"Secular" analysis has one big advantage that religion doesn't have: it can appeal to people of all faiths (and of no faith). If I argue that repealing Sunday blue laws will help the economy, that argument has an appeal for everyone, an appeal that is quite different from one relying on a particular interpretation of a particular holy book that Sunday is "God's day". Similarly, if I argue that not repealing Sunday blue laws is better because it gives small business owners a respite from having to run their business 7 days a week, that argument is accessible to everyone. But arguments that depend on one particular dogma and implicitly demand that I take the dogma seriously or at least "respect" it, fail by their very nature to have universal appeal.
Yes, I know he's a "literary theorist" and "legal scholar" and he has a Ph. D. and wrote 10 books and has a lecture series named after him. But he's still a moron.
Want proof? Read this column in the New York Times. There Professor Fish, favorably quoting a book by Steven Smith, tells us that "secularism" is completely incapable of answering any "real" questions: "...there are no secular reasons, at least not reasons of the kind that could justify a decision to take one course of action rather than another."
So what does Fish think provides these reasons? Why, religion of course.
This argument is so stupid that I find it hard to accept that Fish really believes it. So either he's dishonest (which wouldn't surprise me), or he's a moron. Giving him the benefit of the doubt, the latter option is more palatable.
"Secular" analysis just means thinking about things without relying on religious dogma. When Muslims outlaw interest because their holy book forbids "usury", secular thinkers can point to economic analysis that is noncontroversial outside religious communities: that having money today has value over money ten years from now. When Jehovah's Witnesses prevent their children from having blood transfusions that would save their children's lives because of their interpretation of the Christian bible, secular thinkers can point to the safety of the procedure and the likelihood the child will die without it.
Social science research can reveal aspects of the human character that suggest some ways of structuring our society are better than others. By "better" I mean that they result in happier, prosperous, and freer people, and a more just society. Fish may answer that my devotion to these principles is not "secular". But it clearly is - it is driven by my own self-interest and by principles that are generally accepted, without any reliance on religion or "notions about a purposive cosmos, or a teleological nature". And evolutionary psychology can help explain why people think and act they way they do.
"Secular" analysis doesn't mean all secularists will agree on everything. Some may think (as I do) that a woman's right to autonomy over her own body clearly trumps the right of an embryo to come to term, while others may disagree. But neither do all theists agree: Christians can't even agree on the most basic fact about Christianity, whether good works or faith alone gets you into their heaven. So advancing religion as the answer to ethical quandaries is not in the least helpful.
"Secular" analysis has one big advantage that religion doesn't have: it can appeal to people of all faiths (and of no faith). If I argue that repealing Sunday blue laws will help the economy, that argument has an appeal for everyone, an appeal that is quite different from one relying on a particular interpretation of a particular holy book that Sunday is "God's day". Similarly, if I argue that not repealing Sunday blue laws is better because it gives small business owners a respite from having to run their business 7 days a week, that argument is accessible to everyone. But arguments that depend on one particular dogma and implicitly demand that I take the dogma seriously or at least "respect" it, fail by their very nature to have universal appeal.
Saturday, February 20, 2010
My Genetic Journey (Part 2)
About a year and a half ago, I got a kit from National Geographic's Genographic Project to determine my paternal "deep ancestry", and I talked about the results here.
This year I got a kit to do my maternal line, through mitochondrial DNA, and the results are depicted below:
No real surprise: I am a member of haplogroup H, the most common mitochondrial haplogroup in Europe. My great-grandmother was Emma Hesburn Dean, whose ancestors likely came from England or Ireland. (I don't know more because she was adopted at an early age, and I've been unable to locate her parents, who are said on her death certificate to be Charles Dean and Barbara Hall, in any genealogical records.)
Mitochondrial Eve, the most recent common ancestor (along the female line) of all humans, probably lived about 150,000 years ago in East Africa. From there, mutations in the particular region of mitochondrial DNA suggest the following line of descent: L1/L0 -> L2 -> L3 -> N -> R -> pre-HV -> HV -> H. L3 corresponds to the first humans to have left Africa. N lived in the eastern Mediterranean and western Asia. HV corresponds to Turkey and Georgia. Finally H corresponds to the rise of the Aurignacian culture in Western Europe. H probably arrived in Europe about 30,000 years ago. My maternal ancestors probably lived in England or Ireland for thousands of years before emigrating to the US - perhaps in the 1800's.
This year I got a kit to do my maternal line, through mitochondrial DNA, and the results are depicted below:
No real surprise: I am a member of haplogroup H, the most common mitochondrial haplogroup in Europe. My great-grandmother was Emma Hesburn Dean, whose ancestors likely came from England or Ireland. (I don't know more because she was adopted at an early age, and I've been unable to locate her parents, who are said on her death certificate to be Charles Dean and Barbara Hall, in any genealogical records.)
Mitochondrial Eve, the most recent common ancestor (along the female line) of all humans, probably lived about 150,000 years ago in East Africa. From there, mutations in the particular region of mitochondrial DNA suggest the following line of descent: L1/L0 -> L2 -> L3 -> N -> R -> pre-HV -> HV -> H. L3 corresponds to the first humans to have left Africa. N lived in the eastern Mediterranean and western Asia. HV corresponds to Turkey and Georgia. Finally H corresponds to the rise of the Aurignacian culture in Western Europe. H probably arrived in Europe about 30,000 years ago. My maternal ancestors probably lived in England or Ireland for thousands of years before emigrating to the US - perhaps in the 1800's.
Friday, February 19, 2010
My Eulogy for Kenneth Iverson
Kenneth Iverson (1920-2004) was a computer scientist who invented the computer language APL. I was invited to speak at the Iverson memorial in Toronto on November 18 2004. I had lost my notes for my eulogy, but luckily Catherine Lathwell, who is working on a documentary about APL, has a copy of the videotape, and you can watch it here.
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Test if You Know What You Don't Know
One of my favorite quotes is due to the American humorist Josh Billings (Henry Wheeler Shaw):
"I honestly beleave it iz better tew know nothing than two know what ain't so."
Sometimes this is reported as:
"It's not what you don't know that scares me; it's what you know for sure that just ain't so."
Now here's a little test that claims to identify your "risk intelligence quotient": not what you know, but how accurate your estimates are of what you do know.
I'd love to see the blustering creationists Denyse O'Leary and Kirk Durston take this test. My guess is, they wouldn't score very high.
So take it, and leave your score in the comments.
"I honestly beleave it iz better tew know nothing than two know what ain't so."
Sometimes this is reported as:
"It's not what you don't know that scares me; it's what you know for sure that just ain't so."
Now here's a little test that claims to identify your "risk intelligence quotient": not what you know, but how accurate your estimates are of what you do know.
I'd love to see the blustering creationists Denyse O'Leary and Kirk Durston take this test. My guess is, they wouldn't score very high.
So take it, and leave your score in the comments.
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
The Vacuity of Intelligent Design
Lawyer and ID advocate Barry Arrington has a post up at Uncommon Descent in which he says that ID is not bogus because his grandfather could tell the difference between an arrowhead created by prehistoric Native Americans and a rock. Arrington writes, "In my grandfather’s judgment each rock he added to his collection was different from the thousands upon thousands of rocks he rejected because it bore complex marks that conformed to a specified pattern."
Let's remember that ID advocates claim to have provided a mathematically-rigorous method to detect design. In The Design Inference and No Free Lunch, William Dembski supposedly laid out a series of mathematical steps required to infer design. These steps require a pattern specification, a rejection region, a list of background knowledge, etc., etc. Now, the ability to tell a genuine artifact from a natural rock would be of great benefit to archaeologists. So where is the specification for arrowheads? What is the rejection region? What is the background knowledge? Why aren't ID "theorists" publishing papers in archaeology journals providing their revolutionary method for distinguishing artifacts from natural objects? This was one of our challenges from 2003. Here it is 7 years later, and not a single intelligent design advocate has taken it up. ID is scientifically vacuous.
Arrington says, "Once one concedes that at least in some instances intelligent agents leave behind objectively discernable indicia of design, the intellectual jig is up – you have left the door wide open for the theory of intelligent design." Why? The examples he cites - forensics, archaelogy, cryptology - aren't about design in the abstract, but rather about the specific case of human design. No archaeologist holds up an artifact and pronounces, "This was made by an intelligence." Rather, part of archaeology (and not even the most interesting part *) is about distinguishing human-made artifacts from natural ones. We recognize artifacts not because they satisfy some "design inference", but because we recognize them as the characteristic product of human activity, and because they fit into a larger picture of our understanding of a culture obtained through other means (e.g., radiometric dating).
Arrington writes, "My grandfather knew absolutely nothing about the Indians that carved his points; yet that did not preclude him from making a design inference. Similarly, ID acknowledges that the empirical evidence tells us nothing about the identity of the designer, who may be natural or supernatural." But this is untrue. When we find an arrowhead, we infer it was made by people, who are biologically identical to us, with the same basic needs of food and shelter -- not by intelligent crabs, robots, or magical beings. Because of this, we can deduce the purpose of an arrowhead, and with more work, we can determine what kinds of animals were killed and how they were butchered. With radiometric dating, we can figure out when the events took place. And it's not just the arrowhead that tells us something about the people that made it: multiple lines of confirming, independent evidence (from DNA analysis of native Americans to studies of butchered bones) can help build a picture of the arrowhead's creator.
But ID advocates don't even know that there was any agent around at the time they claim DNA was created, and they offer no independent way to check that this agent existed. Further, they don't allow us to inquire about the nature of the agent. ID is vacuous because, contrary to the claims of advocates, it doesn't provide anything that scientists actually want.
* The interesting part is to determine who made an artifact and why, and how it fits into our understanding of the culture. For example, when archaeologists discovered Bronze Age wall paintings at Thera, they didn't proclaim "These were made by an intelligence!" Such a pronouncement would be regarded as idiotic. The interesting question is to determine the purpose: were they purely decorative, part of a shrine, or did they have some entirely different meaning? However, ID advocates tell us that we are not allowed to inquire as to the nature and purpose of the designer, at least when the designer is the one (ones?) who designed DNA.
Let's remember that ID advocates claim to have provided a mathematically-rigorous method to detect design. In The Design Inference and No Free Lunch, William Dembski supposedly laid out a series of mathematical steps required to infer design. These steps require a pattern specification, a rejection region, a list of background knowledge, etc., etc. Now, the ability to tell a genuine artifact from a natural rock would be of great benefit to archaeologists. So where is the specification for arrowheads? What is the rejection region? What is the background knowledge? Why aren't ID "theorists" publishing papers in archaeology journals providing their revolutionary method for distinguishing artifacts from natural objects? This was one of our challenges from 2003. Here it is 7 years later, and not a single intelligent design advocate has taken it up. ID is scientifically vacuous.
Arrington says, "Once one concedes that at least in some instances intelligent agents leave behind objectively discernable indicia of design, the intellectual jig is up – you have left the door wide open for the theory of intelligent design." Why? The examples he cites - forensics, archaelogy, cryptology - aren't about design in the abstract, but rather about the specific case of human design. No archaeologist holds up an artifact and pronounces, "This was made by an intelligence." Rather, part of archaeology (and not even the most interesting part *) is about distinguishing human-made artifacts from natural ones. We recognize artifacts not because they satisfy some "design inference", but because we recognize them as the characteristic product of human activity, and because they fit into a larger picture of our understanding of a culture obtained through other means (e.g., radiometric dating).
Arrington writes, "My grandfather knew absolutely nothing about the Indians that carved his points; yet that did not preclude him from making a design inference. Similarly, ID acknowledges that the empirical evidence tells us nothing about the identity of the designer, who may be natural or supernatural." But this is untrue. When we find an arrowhead, we infer it was made by people, who are biologically identical to us, with the same basic needs of food and shelter -- not by intelligent crabs, robots, or magical beings. Because of this, we can deduce the purpose of an arrowhead, and with more work, we can determine what kinds of animals were killed and how they were butchered. With radiometric dating, we can figure out when the events took place. And it's not just the arrowhead that tells us something about the people that made it: multiple lines of confirming, independent evidence (from DNA analysis of native Americans to studies of butchered bones) can help build a picture of the arrowhead's creator.
But ID advocates don't even know that there was any agent around at the time they claim DNA was created, and they offer no independent way to check that this agent existed. Further, they don't allow us to inquire about the nature of the agent. ID is vacuous because, contrary to the claims of advocates, it doesn't provide anything that scientists actually want.
* The interesting part is to determine who made an artifact and why, and how it fits into our understanding of the culture. For example, when archaeologists discovered Bronze Age wall paintings at Thera, they didn't proclaim "These were made by an intelligence!" Such a pronouncement would be regarded as idiotic. The interesting question is to determine the purpose: were they purely decorative, part of a shrine, or did they have some entirely different meaning? However, ID advocates tell us that we are not allowed to inquire as to the nature and purpose of the designer, at least when the designer is the one (ones?) who designed DNA.
Monday, February 15, 2010
Update on the Rom Houben Story
You may recall my previous discussion of the Rom Houben case. Houben is the Dutch man who has been in a coma for over 20 years, and was "discovered" to be conscious and capable of expressing his thoughts coherently through the bogus technique of "facilitated communication", or FC.
I and many other skeptics had doubts about the facilitated communication part of the story, while creationists such as Denyse O'Leary bought it unquestioningly. Creationist Kirk Durston joined the fray in the comments here, with Kirk claiming it was "doubtful that this team of scientists, headed by Laureys, is falling for fake messages typed out by a crackpot assistant" and assuring us that "We can infer from that, that what we are seeing in the video is a method that Laureys’ team has developed, or helped develop." Further, Durston accused another skeptic, the renowned bioethicist Arthur Caplan, of being "unethical" for pointing out that the bogus FC technique had been used.
Now Orac reports that O'Leary and Durston were wrong on all accounts. Further tests have shown that, indeed, Houben was not able to communicate through FC, and that Laureys and his team were, in fact, taken in by the bogus claims of an FC practitioner.
I also observe that FC has nothing to do with the other work of Laurey's team, namely developing a way to communicate with patients by asking them to associate "yes" with, e.g., thinking about playing tennis and "no" with thinking about being in his house. That's an interesting, though still controversial, idea that may be useful. It is a shame that Laureys' reputation will certainly suffer from his association with FC on Houben and his failure to use adequate controls when testing the FC claim. I also note that Laureys did not forthrightly respond to questions about his use of FC and never answered my query about it.
I feel very sorry for Rom Houben, who may be conscious but has had his voice stolen by FC crackpottery that Laureys helped publicize.
As for Denyse O'Leary and Kirk Durston, they were insufficiently skeptical and came to the wrong conclusion. Will we see them admit it? Will Durston apologize for his libel of Caplan?
I and many other skeptics had doubts about the facilitated communication part of the story, while creationists such as Denyse O'Leary bought it unquestioningly. Creationist Kirk Durston joined the fray in the comments here, with Kirk claiming it was "doubtful that this team of scientists, headed by Laureys, is falling for fake messages typed out by a crackpot assistant" and assuring us that "We can infer from that, that what we are seeing in the video is a method that Laureys’ team has developed, or helped develop." Further, Durston accused another skeptic, the renowned bioethicist Arthur Caplan, of being "unethical" for pointing out that the bogus FC technique had been used.
Now Orac reports that O'Leary and Durston were wrong on all accounts. Further tests have shown that, indeed, Houben was not able to communicate through FC, and that Laureys and his team were, in fact, taken in by the bogus claims of an FC practitioner.
I also observe that FC has nothing to do with the other work of Laurey's team, namely developing a way to communicate with patients by asking them to associate "yes" with, e.g., thinking about playing tennis and "no" with thinking about being in his house. That's an interesting, though still controversial, idea that may be useful. It is a shame that Laureys' reputation will certainly suffer from his association with FC on Houben and his failure to use adequate controls when testing the FC claim. I also note that Laureys did not forthrightly respond to questions about his use of FC and never answered my query about it.
I feel very sorry for Rom Houben, who may be conscious but has had his voice stolen by FC crackpottery that Laureys helped publicize.
As for Denyse O'Leary and Kirk Durston, they were insufficiently skeptical and came to the wrong conclusion. Will we see them admit it? Will Durston apologize for his libel of Caplan?
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Cornelius Hunter on Parsimony
The creationist Cornelius Hunter has a post where he attempts to cast doubt on the evolution of placental mammals because he finds the current explanations too complicated. Science values parsimony, he says. This explanation is too complicated and hence we should doubt it.
I really wonder if Hunter has ever studied geology. Explanations for the current configuration of the earth are often extraordinarily complicated. Just study the geology of Idaho. Even the basement rock alone has a description as complicated as:
"The Albion and Pioneer Ranges contain metamorphic core complexes, which expose middle-crustal metamorphic rocks in the center, beneath younger sedimentary rocks along a low-angle normal fault. The Archean and Proterozoic metamorphic rocks contain gneiss and schist that originated as part of the Archean continental crust as well as Paleoproterozoic juvenile volcanic arc rocks. They have been subsequently metamorphosed and intruded, notably in Cretaceous, Eocene and Oligocene time. They are exposed today from Neogene regional extension of the Basin and Range Province."
Why is geology so complicated? Well, largely because it is contingent: it depends on many factors, such as the composition of the early earth. And that, in turn, depended on cosmic bombardment during the formation of the solar system. And that depended on a supernova event prior to the solar system. Add meteorite strikes from outer space, catastrophic floods, and the effects of continental drift and various orogenies, and you've got a recipe for complication.
Well, biology is like that, too. But it's even worse, since in biology we have imperfect self-replication together with contingency. Pretending that this is not likely to result in complex outcomes and a convoluted evolutionary history is an absurd fantasy.
I really wonder if Hunter has ever studied geology. Explanations for the current configuration of the earth are often extraordinarily complicated. Just study the geology of Idaho. Even the basement rock alone has a description as complicated as:
"The Albion and Pioneer Ranges contain metamorphic core complexes, which expose middle-crustal metamorphic rocks in the center, beneath younger sedimentary rocks along a low-angle normal fault. The Archean and Proterozoic metamorphic rocks contain gneiss and schist that originated as part of the Archean continental crust as well as Paleoproterozoic juvenile volcanic arc rocks. They have been subsequently metamorphosed and intruded, notably in Cretaceous, Eocene and Oligocene time. They are exposed today from Neogene regional extension of the Basin and Range Province."
Why is geology so complicated? Well, largely because it is contingent: it depends on many factors, such as the composition of the early earth. And that, in turn, depended on cosmic bombardment during the formation of the solar system. And that depended on a supernova event prior to the solar system. Add meteorite strikes from outer space, catastrophic floods, and the effects of continental drift and various orogenies, and you've got a recipe for complication.
Well, biology is like that, too. But it's even worse, since in biology we have imperfect self-replication together with contingency. Pretending that this is not likely to result in complex outcomes and a convoluted evolutionary history is an absurd fantasy.
Tuesday, February 09, 2010
Recursive Podcast
In keeping with the title of this blog, you may enjoy this video of a podcaster demonstrating how to play his own podcast:
Monday, February 08, 2010
Suzan Mazur - Perpetually Clueless
Suzan Mazur is the "journalist" who attended a meeting on evolution, misunderstood nearly everything that was going on, and has now cashed in on her misunderstanding by writing a book. Needless to say, the people who organized the meeting were not amused.
Now she's back, as clueless as ever, with an article at Counterpunch on peer-review.
She claims "Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini report colleagues attempted to silence them from publishing in their new book that Darwin's claim was wrong about natural selection." But somehow these attempts failed, since not only did Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini manage to publish their book, but they also got a long article in New Scientist about it. What was the nature of these "attempt[s] to silence them"? Mazur, the eminent journalist, doesn't tell us, but she does refer to "dark forces". (No, really!) For some amusement, read the comments in New Scientist on the article of Fodor and Piattelli-Palmirini. A rough estimate shows that about 90% of the comments are negative to their claims, pointing out that the article is misinformed and inaccurate.
I'd be willing to bet dollars to doughnuts that these "attempt[s] to silence them" consisted of their friends telling them they would make laughingstocks of themselves if they proceeded to publish their half-baked ideas. And their friends were right.
Mazur asks, "Why not just thrash these ideas out in the open as in other professional fields[?]" But in fact, there is peer-review in all professional fields. Try to get an article published in a law review or an engineering journal while demanding it not be peer-reviewed, and see how well you do.
Clueless Mazur says, "I was curious how journal reviewers are paid...". Well, that just shows she knows absolutely nothing about peer-review. But her own ignorance of the system is not the fit subject for an article.
She then asks, "What then is the incentive? Why do these extremely busy scientists work as slaves?" but doesn't manage to find the answer. Here are the reasons:
1. Every field has a certain deontology. In science, you are, as a member of the community, expected to do things like review grant proposals, referee papers, and write letters for students and colleagues. Only very rarely do you get paid to do this. Those who don't pull their weight are essentially freeloaders on the system.
2. By refereeing papers, you (sometimes) get to see interesting ideas before publication. By making suggestions, you get to help shape the ideas and the presentation. Heck, if you have something worthwhile to say, sometimes you even get to be a co-author.
3. By refereeing papers, you get to learn what other people are working on. Sticking to your own ideas can sometimes be sterile.
4. When it comes time for your annual report to your department, showing that you are refereeing papers is a sign that your work is respected in the community.
5. Finally, I'll quote what Leonard Eugene Dickson said when asked why he spent 10 years of his career writing the 3-volume History of the Theory of Numbers: "it fitted with my conviction that every person should aim to perform at some time in his life some serious useful work for which it is highly improbable that there will be any reward whatever other than his satisfaction therefrom".
Mazur asks, "But could such journal board positions simply be fast-tracks to publication of an editor’s or an editorial board member’s own work and a tool for access to grant money?" No, to the first. It is considered a conflict of interest for a journal to allow an editor to handle his/her own paper. I edit a journal, the Journal of Integer Sequences, which would be a good venue for much of my own work. But none of my work is published in that journal. As for a "tool for access to grant money", whether someone referees papers or not is rarely or never considered in deciding whether to award a grant. Service on editorial boards may help you a little, but not as much as good work.
Mazur gives other stories about authors who've had trouble getting their paper published. She sees it as conspiracy or incompetence. But she fails to consider the most parsimonious explanation: papers usually get rejected because they are crap. I just got a paper rejected because I and my co-authors didn't know about some previous work, but you don't see me whining about it. Instead, we'll rewrite the paper and make it better.
Mazur seems to find it incomprehensible that a paper can get rejected within 36 hours. I edit a journal, so I know what they're like. I have rejected a paper even quicker. It is pretty easy to tell whether a paper is completely bogus or out of scope for my journal. When a paper gets rejected that quickly, it's a fair bet that one of those two reasons applies.
Too bad there wasn't some peer review for Mazur's own uninformed and silly article.
Now she's back, as clueless as ever, with an article at Counterpunch on peer-review.
She claims "Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini report colleagues attempted to silence them from publishing in their new book that Darwin's claim was wrong about natural selection." But somehow these attempts failed, since not only did Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini manage to publish their book, but they also got a long article in New Scientist about it. What was the nature of these "attempt[s] to silence them"? Mazur, the eminent journalist, doesn't tell us, but she does refer to "dark forces". (No, really!) For some amusement, read the comments in New Scientist on the article of Fodor and Piattelli-Palmirini. A rough estimate shows that about 90% of the comments are negative to their claims, pointing out that the article is misinformed and inaccurate.
I'd be willing to bet dollars to doughnuts that these "attempt[s] to silence them" consisted of their friends telling them they would make laughingstocks of themselves if they proceeded to publish their half-baked ideas. And their friends were right.
Mazur asks, "Why not just thrash these ideas out in the open as in other professional fields[?]" But in fact, there is peer-review in all professional fields. Try to get an article published in a law review or an engineering journal while demanding it not be peer-reviewed, and see how well you do.
Clueless Mazur says, "I was curious how journal reviewers are paid...". Well, that just shows she knows absolutely nothing about peer-review. But her own ignorance of the system is not the fit subject for an article.
She then asks, "What then is the incentive? Why do these extremely busy scientists work as slaves?" but doesn't manage to find the answer. Here are the reasons:
1. Every field has a certain deontology. In science, you are, as a member of the community, expected to do things like review grant proposals, referee papers, and write letters for students and colleagues. Only very rarely do you get paid to do this. Those who don't pull their weight are essentially freeloaders on the system.
2. By refereeing papers, you (sometimes) get to see interesting ideas before publication. By making suggestions, you get to help shape the ideas and the presentation. Heck, if you have something worthwhile to say, sometimes you even get to be a co-author.
3. By refereeing papers, you get to learn what other people are working on. Sticking to your own ideas can sometimes be sterile.
4. When it comes time for your annual report to your department, showing that you are refereeing papers is a sign that your work is respected in the community.
5. Finally, I'll quote what Leonard Eugene Dickson said when asked why he spent 10 years of his career writing the 3-volume History of the Theory of Numbers: "it fitted with my conviction that every person should aim to perform at some time in his life some serious useful work for which it is highly improbable that there will be any reward whatever other than his satisfaction therefrom".
Mazur asks, "But could such journal board positions simply be fast-tracks to publication of an editor’s or an editorial board member’s own work and a tool for access to grant money?" No, to the first. It is considered a conflict of interest for a journal to allow an editor to handle his/her own paper. I edit a journal, the Journal of Integer Sequences, which would be a good venue for much of my own work. But none of my work is published in that journal. As for a "tool for access to grant money", whether someone referees papers or not is rarely or never considered in deciding whether to award a grant. Service on editorial boards may help you a little, but not as much as good work.
Mazur gives other stories about authors who've had trouble getting their paper published. She sees it as conspiracy or incompetence. But she fails to consider the most parsimonious explanation: papers usually get rejected because they are crap. I just got a paper rejected because I and my co-authors didn't know about some previous work, but you don't see me whining about it. Instead, we'll rewrite the paper and make it better.
Mazur seems to find it incomprehensible that a paper can get rejected within 36 hours. I edit a journal, so I know what they're like. I have rejected a paper even quicker. It is pretty easy to tell whether a paper is completely bogus or out of scope for my journal. When a paper gets rejected that quickly, it's a fair bet that one of those two reasons applies.
Too bad there wasn't some peer review for Mazur's own uninformed and silly article.
Saturday, February 06, 2010
Cashill on Sternberg
It's interesting to compare this screed by creepy far-right loony Jack Cashill on the Sternberg affair with this one by Ed Brayton. Sternberg, as you may recall, was the editor who published Stephen Meyer's lousy paper on intelligent design in Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington.
Note the differences: Cashill claims Sternberg "learned first hand the lengths that establishment will go to suppress dissent", while Brayton observes that "The evidence does not support the conclusion that Sternberg was discriminated against in any material way".
Cashill claims Meyer's paper was "tightly argued" but somehow fails to mention the fact that the paper's claims have been rebutted in detail. Cashill also somehow fails to mention that the Biological Society of Washington issued a disclaimer about the Meyer paper.
Cashill claims that "hell ... rained down upon" Sternberg after the publication of the paper. But Brayton points out that, in fact, "Sternberg has grossly exaggerated several alleged instances of “retaliation” in the early days of the scandal."
But when you're a far-right loony commentator, the facts don't really concern you. All that matters is making points against those damned godless liberal evilutionists.
Note the differences: Cashill claims Sternberg "learned first hand the lengths that establishment will go to suppress dissent", while Brayton observes that "The evidence does not support the conclusion that Sternberg was discriminated against in any material way".
Cashill claims Meyer's paper was "tightly argued" but somehow fails to mention the fact that the paper's claims have been rebutted in detail. Cashill also somehow fails to mention that the Biological Society of Washington issued a disclaimer about the Meyer paper.
Cashill claims that "hell ... rained down upon" Sternberg after the publication of the paper. But Brayton points out that, in fact, "Sternberg has grossly exaggerated several alleged instances of “retaliation” in the early days of the scandal."
But when you're a far-right loony commentator, the facts don't really concern you. All that matters is making points against those damned godless liberal evilutionists.
Friday, February 05, 2010
A Test for Intelligent Design
Intelligent design advocates claim over and over again that their pseudoscience is just "the study of patterns in nature that are best explained as the result of intelligence". They claim to have a mathematically-rigorous way to detect design. Oddly enough, however, they have been unable to apply their methods to anything outside toy examples.
Wesley Elsberry and I posed eight challenges to intelligent design advocates in 2003. Now, almost seven years later, none of those challenges have been met.
Well, here's another opportunity for ID to prove its worth. The Cygnus bubble is a very unusual configuration discovered in July 2008. Although some think it is a nebula, others have suggested it is a Dyson sphere, proposed hallmark of an advanced civilization. Resolving this question is precisely what ID claims to be able to do.
So, how about it, intelligent design advocates? Let's have your answer, including full calculations.
Wesley Elsberry and I posed eight challenges to intelligent design advocates in 2003. Now, almost seven years later, none of those challenges have been met.
Well, here's another opportunity for ID to prove its worth. The Cygnus bubble is a very unusual configuration discovered in July 2008. Although some think it is a nebula, others have suggested it is a Dyson sphere, proposed hallmark of an advanced civilization. Resolving this question is precisely what ID claims to be able to do.
So, how about it, intelligent design advocates? Let's have your answer, including full calculations.
Thursday, February 04, 2010
Meyer's Interview of Berlinski
Here's an interview of David Berlinski by creationist Stephen Meyer, author of Signature in the Cell.
It's really fascinating for all the mistakes and false claims made by Berlinski, none of which are corrected by Meyer. Here are just a few:
1. Despite the fact that he claims to be intimate with Marco Schützenberger, Berlinski mispronounces his name consistently as ending in "berger" with a hard g, instead of soft g as in French.
2. He claims that Schützenberger was a "professional biologist". This is not accurate. Schützenberger's first doctorate was in medicine, not biology. He apparently did publish at least one paper on a biological topic, but one paper does not make someone a "professional biologist". (I've published a paper in a philosophy journal, but no one would call me a "professional philosopher".) In this interview, Schützenberger admits forthrightly that "Biology is, of course, not my specialty."
3. He claims that Schützenberger was a "world-famous physician". As far as I can tell, this is not true.
4. Berlinski draws an analogy between evolution and the difference in computational power of finite automata and pushdown automata. In finite automata, only simple outcomes are possible because they have no memory; pushdown automata can do more interesting things because they have an unbounded stack. Evolution has no memory, Berlinski says, and therefore is analogous to finite automata.
But this analogy is simple-minded for a variety of reasons. First, while finite automata are limited in their computational power, in practical applications this can sometimes be remedied simply by increasing the number of states. Second, neither finite automata nor pushdown automata are self-replicating models. Third, if you consider that replication is based on DNA, which is potentially unbounded in size, then evolution does have access to a form of memory that is, for all practical purposes, unbounded in size.
5. Berlinski claims that "Until about 1950 or 1960, the mathematicians had not really interested themselves in Darwin's theory of evolution". This is false. The Hardy-Weinberg theorem, for example, dates from 1908. Population genetics was developed by biologists and statisticians in the 1920's and 1930's. Population dynamics goes back to the 1800's.
6. Berlinski claims that "Every mathematician that I've known ... they all had the same reaction [about evolution]: it's kind of nutty." Berlinski knows me - we have corresponded - and I never expressed this reaction to him. There are many books and papers about mathematical biology, and essentially none of the authors express this view.
But then, we already know that Berlinski's claims about what mathematicians believe about evolution are not reliable.
It's really fascinating for all the mistakes and false claims made by Berlinski, none of which are corrected by Meyer. Here are just a few:
1. Despite the fact that he claims to be intimate with Marco Schützenberger, Berlinski mispronounces his name consistently as ending in "berger" with a hard g, instead of soft g as in French.
2. He claims that Schützenberger was a "professional biologist". This is not accurate. Schützenberger's first doctorate was in medicine, not biology. He apparently did publish at least one paper on a biological topic, but one paper does not make someone a "professional biologist". (I've published a paper in a philosophy journal, but no one would call me a "professional philosopher".) In this interview, Schützenberger admits forthrightly that "Biology is, of course, not my specialty."
3. He claims that Schützenberger was a "world-famous physician". As far as I can tell, this is not true.
4. Berlinski draws an analogy between evolution and the difference in computational power of finite automata and pushdown automata. In finite automata, only simple outcomes are possible because they have no memory; pushdown automata can do more interesting things because they have an unbounded stack. Evolution has no memory, Berlinski says, and therefore is analogous to finite automata.
But this analogy is simple-minded for a variety of reasons. First, while finite automata are limited in their computational power, in practical applications this can sometimes be remedied simply by increasing the number of states. Second, neither finite automata nor pushdown automata are self-replicating models. Third, if you consider that replication is based on DNA, which is potentially unbounded in size, then evolution does have access to a form of memory that is, for all practical purposes, unbounded in size.
5. Berlinski claims that "Until about 1950 or 1960, the mathematicians had not really interested themselves in Darwin's theory of evolution". This is false. The Hardy-Weinberg theorem, for example, dates from 1908. Population genetics was developed by biologists and statisticians in the 1920's and 1930's. Population dynamics goes back to the 1800's.
6. Berlinski claims that "Every mathematician that I've known ... they all had the same reaction [about evolution]: it's kind of nutty." Berlinski knows me - we have corresponded - and I never expressed this reaction to him. There are many books and papers about mathematical biology, and essentially none of the authors express this view.
But then, we already know that Berlinski's claims about what mathematicians believe about evolution are not reliable.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
