This is an oldie, but a goodie: Sam Harris versus David Wolpe:
I think Harris definitely gets the best of Wolpe, although Wolpe's no slouch. There are so many good lines by Harris it's hard to list them all. For example, "We need to cease to reward people for pretending to know things they do not know. And the only area of discourse where we do this is on the subject of God."
What interests me more, though, is Wolpe's utter confusion when it comes to understanding neuroscience (at 44:50):
"The reason that our minds can do something more than just operate on instinct is because we operate all the time with things that are not physical, right: ideas, words... I can say something and change the physiology of your brain. Now how is that unless there's something more to your brain than physiology?"
This is remarkably dim. Ideas and words are not physical? An idea is a certain pattern of our neurophysiology. Spoken words are vibrations of the air. The patterns thus formed are interpreted by the nerves in the ear and are transmitted to the brain as electrical signals. Calling these things "not physical" betrays an ignorant, pre-scientific view of the world.
I wonder where Wolpe thinks ideas reside, if not in the brains of humans and other animals? In some magical ethereal realm?
I can say something and change the physiology of my computer. Heck, if my toaster is hooked up to some voice recognition, I can say something and change the physiology of a piece of bread. How does that imply that there's "something more" to a piece of bread?
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Perhaps Wolpe was listening to Jeffrey Schwarz (associated with the Discovery Institute), who thinks that neuroplasticity, the fact that physical changes in the brain happen due to experience, is proof that the consciousness can't have a material explanation. I can't see how he arrives at that conclusion, but I've heard him assert it.
Jeff, are you really saying that an idea that exists exists only in human brains? Doesn’t 2 exist? And won’t it exist to the same degree that it does now when there no longer are any brains to think on it?
Yes, I think that "2" has no independent existence. If you think it does, please tell me where you think it exists.
Jeff, are you really saying that an idea that exists exists only in human brains? Doesn’t 2 exist? And won’t it exist to the same degree that it does now when there no longer are any brains to think on it?
Do you subscribe to some kind of Platonic Realism, in that you believe that abstractions or universals have an "existence" or "form" somewhere in a non-material nether-verse? Because although I have read lots about Platonic Realists, I have never actually met one and have always wanted to ask them if they believe that abstract universals like "existencelessness" and "formlessness" have existence and form.
Jeffrey,
What do you think about the kind of Platonism proposed by Bertrand Russell in his Problems of Philosophy, in which relations are the only universals taken to exist? That book is one of his early works, and there's probably much in it that he later changed his mind about.
Also, why is it necessary for 2 to exist somewhere for it to exist?
What do you take "exist" to mean?
Good point. I realized shortly after commenting that I don't have a ready-made definition for 'exist'. Here's a stab at it: something exists if it is part of the minimal set of things or concepts necessary to give a description of the natural world. At first glance that seems to let too much in. I'll keep trying. And don't worry, I'm not a troll here to peddle woo. Anyway, are you familiar with that little book of Russell's?
Also, thanks for posting the Wolpe-Harris debate. Wolpe is a likeable guy, but his equivocation on 'belief' really ruined any chance of making a good argument. Also, he had to throw in the "Hitler-Stalin-Mao-Pol-Pot-were-atheists" routine that is more typical of fundagelicals. Poor form.
I went back and read the relevant chapter in The Problems of Philosophy (available online http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus9.html). I had forgotten that Russell makes a distinction between ordinary particular objects which must exist at some point in time (and presumably space, too), and universal relations which subsist, but are neither physical nor mental. Earlier in the book, he distinguishes between objects of thought and the act of thinking of them. So any time you think of 2, that thought is an occurrence in the brain, but that doesn't mean that 2 has no independent subsistence outside of minds.
None of this, even if valid, does anything to aid Wolpe's attempt to derive something magical from the fact that his spoken words can influence someone else's mind. I was only trying to suggest that it is not necessary to reject the idea that there are nonphysical things that exist (or subsist) independently of occurrences in the brain to avoid Wolpe's mysticism. That the words of the speaker and the brain activity of the listener conform to a common pattern does not prove that what we call consciousness arises from nonphysical causes.
I botched the tags for the link in my last comment: http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus9.html
By the way, what kinds of things do you consider to exist? In particular, what is the status of mathematical objects and propositions--do they have a reality independent of the community of math-doers who think about them?
Most mathematicians seem to act as if the objects they study have some independent existence. I used to believe that, too. But I no longer think so.
This might be a topic for a future post, but I have no time now.
Okay, no problem.
"Remarkably dim"
Mental objects as such are not physical. When I am aware of concepts I am aware of non-physical, mental objects. I have an idea of an elephant in my mind; but there is no physical elephant in my head. It is a non-physical, mental object. Now as a materialist I can assume that non-physical mental realm supervenes on the neurological, but what you've done is to deny the mental altogether. You are stuck with a view of actual physical elephants in the mind when an agent is aware of the idea of an elephant.
As a Leftist, though, you are somewhat obliged to argue the existence the non-physical objects, such as social justice, an independent moral authority which exercises rightful sovereignty over individual humans, and a plethora of other metaphysically implausible objects. Without your magically entities, the moral truth upon which your leftism is founded is reduced to subjective neurological activity.
So, yeah, it's somewhat hypocritical for you to bash the religious while you cling to equally implausible metaphysical absurdities.
John:
You seem remarkably confused.
"I have an idea of an elephant in my mind; but there is no physical elephant in my head."
As if anyone in this discussion was maintaining that!
"but what you've done is to deny the mental altogether."
Again, a complete fabrication. Of course the "mental" exists. I am only denying that, for example, the number 123 has any existence outside of the mental.
"you are somewhat obliged to argue the existence the non-physical objects, such as social justice"
Social justice exists only in the same way of any other abstract concept: as a pattern stored in the brains of humans. That doesn't mean we can't discuss it and try to achieve it.
"while you cling to equally implausible metaphysical absurdities"
Geez. Make at least some effort to understand the argument!
"I am only denying that, for example, the number 123 has any existence outside of the mental."
No, you claimed that mental objects are physical. Of course your ignorance of phil of mind coupled with your unwarranted confidence in your knowledge of phil of mind blinds you to implications of denying the non-physicality of mental objects. If mental objects are physical, then my awareness of an elephant necessitates and tiny little physical elephant in my *brain,* as oppose to having a non-physical mental object in my *mind.*
"As if anyone in this discussion was maintaining that!"
In your ignorance, that's precisely what you are maintaining.
"Social justice exists only in the same way of any other abstract concept: as a pattern stored in the brains of humans. That doesn't mean we can't discuss it and try to achieve it."
Try to achieve a pattern in a mind? I've known a lot of silly academics, but you are going for a championship here. No, not a philosopher of proponent of social justice to ever live has conceived of social justice or any other type of justice as a pattern to bring into people's minds, or their brains. I would alert you to what is called the queerness of moral realism upon which claims of social justice must be predicated, but you lack the ability to learn. Your hatred filled arrogance precludes learning.
For your readers, however, I can point out that moral realism requires first of all the substitution of a coherence theory of truth in place of the scientifically minded correspondence theory of truth; the explicit reason for this rejection is that the correspondence theory of truth doesn't allow moral statements to be true.
So, if we are going to be scientifically minded, we must reject as false metaphysically queer entities such as moral orders, disembodied values, collective wills, and society as a metaphysical representation.
This reduces Shallit's moral denouncements to subjective value statements, neither true nor false, and having no truth whatsoever.
John:
If you're going to resort to name calling like "hatred filled arrogance", you've already lost.
If mental objects are physical, then my awareness of an elephant necessitates and tiny little physical elephant in my *brain,* as oppose to having a non-physical mental object in my *mind.*
Minds are nothing more than the actions of brains. There is no physical elephant in a brain - and nobody said there was. But there is a *correlate*. When I see an elephant, or think about an elephant, my neurons fire in a certain pattern that is distinct from when I see an aardvark, or think about an aardvark.
Please, try to follow the argument, instead of creating a straw man.
"If you're going to resort to name calling like "hatred filled arrogance", you've already lost."
First of all, I will assume that that mean to to be ironic. After all, I don't know of a single blog on the Internet that is more filled with name calling than yours. My teenage son doesn't incorporate as much name calling as you do. It would be interesting to run a program on your writing to see which percentage of it is juvenile name calling, and then compare that with different age groups to identify yours.
Secondly, name calling doesn't mean I lost an argument. Two plus two is four, nitwit. See what I did? I used name-calling in a mathematically correct statement and it didn't affect the correctness of the statement at all.
Third, I would have assumed you are proud of your level of hatred and arrogance. I see no attempt on your part to moderate your own shrillness, so I assumed it was part of your persona.
"There is no physical elephant in a brain"
Kind of slow to agree with me, but you got it. Mental objects are no physical, and there is nothing "prescientific" or "dim" about that.
"my neurons fire in a certain pattern that is distinct from when I see an aardvark"
There you being confused again. The object of your consciousness is not your neural firing. The object of your consciousness is a non-physical mental object, a conceptual construction that has no temporal existence.
Your failure is to understand the implications of denying the distinction between the mental and the neurological. By insisting that ideas are physical, as you did in the OP, you are forced into the absurd position of positing little, physical ideas in the mind.
What you don't get to do is claim that mental objects are physical and then deny the existence of cute little miniature ideas in the brain. Mental objects may supervene on the neurological, or mental objects may be an illusion and not exist (eliminativism), but mental objects are do not get to be physical. It's you, not the religious nutter you criticize, who is ill informed.
Cheers
John:
I see a lot of assertions, but nothing to back them up. Mental objects certainly do have a physical basis; I don't see how you can deny this. Until you present some evidence that they're not, we're not going to get anywhere.
"Mental objects certainly do have a physical basis; I don't see how you can deny this."
I see you are utterly unfamiliar with the subject. When philosophers say that the mental supervenes on the neurological, the idea is that mental objects have a basis in the neurological (physical). I've never argued otherwise and your innuendo to the contrary is a pretty nigh a straw man.
To say that mental objects have a physical basis is not to say that mental objects are physical. For ideas, principles, concepts to be physical would be akin to Platonic idealism, but instead of Plato's celestial heaven, you are putting those objects in the brain. There are no ideas, concepts or principles in the brain. There is brain matter in the brain. There is neurological activity in the brain.
The evidence that mental objects are not physical is so crude that I'll just paraphrase Dennett: Open up the brain and you will not find a miniature man when you have an idea of man; you will not find a miniature car when you have an idea of a car. That's what physical mental objects entail.
I'll go ahead and assume that you will concede that that ideas and other mental objects are not physical. Feel free to update your OP.
I guess we're at an impasse, because everything you say just seems silly to me. You persist in attacking a straw man.
Of course "you will not find a miniature car [inside the brain] when you have an idea of a car". I never claimed this. But we do have neural correlates that correspond to "car" and not "sheep", for example.
But I also dispute your claim that "That's what physical mental objects entail." Why must that be the case?
There are no ideas, concepts or principles in the brain.
Speak for yourself and your own brain, please.
To John Scott: I am not a philosopher, so please treat my question not as an attack but as an opportunity to understand.
Is, say, a computer program, something "physical" or something "mental"? For example, when I play "Plants vs. Zombies" on my computer, does *anyone* really think there are actual plants or zombies in the computer's memory or processor? I assume the answer is no. So if no one really thinks this is the case, then why do you keep on talking about physical elephants in heads?
"So if no one really thinks this is the case, then why do you keep on talking about physical elephants in heads?"
You'll need to make read the OP. Shallit thinks that mental objects are physical, and to say they are non-physical, he thinks, is pre-scientific.
Write the word elephant on a blank piece of paper. Now, did you just create an elephant? Look at the word – it is physical. Is it a physical elephant? No. If it’s not a physical elephant, where is the physical elephant you see in your mind’s eye? The intelligent answer here is that there is no physical elephant. Mental objects are not physical objects. Get it?
When you write the word "elephant," or speak the word elephant, or reference the mental object in any other way, you are indeed making physical gestures. Shallit takes this to mean that mental objects are physical. He's obtusely ignoring the difference between mental objects and brain activity. Even if one supervenes on the other, that does not mean that one is the other. By insisting that mental objects are physical, he is unwittingly insisting that I have a physical elephant in my head when I have a conception of an elephant.
By insisting that mental objects are physical, he is unwittingly insisting that I have a physical elephant in my head when I have a conception of an elephant.
John - you've repeated this silliness over and over, and I can see there is nothing I can say that would disabuse of this notion.
where is the physical elephant you see in your mind’s eye?
Silly rabbit. There is no physical elephant that one sees in the "mind's eye". Instead, the neurons that fire when you envision an elephant are analogous (or perhaps even the same as) the ones that fire when you do see a physical elephant, thus creating a similar sensation.
So the image corresponding to the elephant you envision is, indeed, a product of materialistic and physical processes.
"... as if the objects they study have some independent existence...
This might be a topic for a future post, but I have no time now."
I would look forward to such a post. It's something I'm curious about.
I hate to flog a dead horse but someone asked "where does 2 exist?". I can imagine sending a dictionary into space. I think a sufficiently clever alien civilization being able to decode that dictionary. In that case, their idea of 2 would match ours in any way that matters. So 2 exists somewhere inside that dictionary.
Or maybe the idea of 2 is different than the mathematical object 2. Maybe that's the distinction you're getting at.
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