The first issue is not promising at all. One article is entitled "The argument from reason and incompleteness theorems" by Ryan Thomas. The author writes about Gödel's theorems, but it's clear he doesn't understand them. Too bad Thomas did not read Torkel Franzén's book, Gödel's Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse; he might have saved himself some embarrassment.
Thomas thinks that Gödel proved that "within a consistent and complete set of axioms there will be at least one statement that is improvable within the system" and "a consistent and complete set of axioms cannot demonstrate its own consistency". Leaving aside the strange use of "improvable" instead of "unprovable", and leaving aside that one does not usually talk about being "within" a set of axioms, Thomas misses the point. The important thing is not that a logical theory has statements that are unprovable -- after all, we'd be unhappy if false statements had proofs in our theory. The interesting facet is the existence of true statements that have no proofs in the theory. Furthermore, Thomas doesn't seem to know that Gödel's theorem does not apply to all axiom systems, but only ones that are sufficiently powerful. There do indeed exist logical theories that can prove their own consistency.
Thomas thinks that Gödel's theorem has some profound consequences for understanding the human brain -- but this is a common misconception. Gödel's theorem is about logical deductions from axioms; but this is only one small and relatively unimportant facet of human reasoning. Most of our reasoning - even down to the level of assigning meanings to words and connecting those words to the physical world - seems probabilistic in nature. We use probabilistic reasoning all the time without being excessively worried about proving its "completeness" or "consistency"; why should logical deduction be any different?
Judging from Thomas's contribution, this journal has an inauspicious debut.