Beg the Question

Here's a great post about the phrase "beg the question", it history, and what to do about its misuse.

A Failed-Self Reference Argument

Steven Goldberg is an American sociologist. In his book, When Wish Replaces Thought, he proposes the following argument against descriptivism, which he seems to think is completely decisive. I found the argument interesting, because it attempts to use self-reference in much the way Turing's proof that the halting problem is unsolvable does. Unfortunately, Goldberg's argument is flawed in several respects.

Here is the relevant passage, which appears on pp. 193-194:


"People with more than a passing interest in words fall into two groups, prescriptivist and descriptivist. The prescriptivist believes that there is an ideal of correctness in the use of words - shifting and temporally based as it ultimately may be. The descriptivist finds the concept of "correctness" elitist at best and, more often, incomprehensible.

"The one inviolable rule of descriptivism is this: There are no correct definitions, meanings, or usages other than those used by people-in-general; any attempt to substitute a definition, meaning, or usage for that used by people-in-general is invalid. Where the prescriptive subordinates popular usage to correct usage, the descriptivist denies to correctness and all other criteria parity with use by people-in-general.

"Now consider what happens when you ask a descriptivist how he defines "dictionary" in his descriptivist dictionary.

"The descriptivist might, as his inviolable rule says he must, accept the definition of "dictionary" used by people-in-general. If he does this, he will define "dictionary" as people-in-general really do, as giving correct definitions, correctness being determined by a literary elite. The descriptivist must accept the view of people-in-general that there is a correct usage -- in this case correct definitions -- because his inviolable rule requires that he accept the view of people-in-general. In granting that there is a correct usage, the descriptivist grants what his inviolable rule, his basic premise, denies.

"The descriptivist might, on the other hand, reject the definition used by people-in-general and substitute the definition of "dictionary" implied by his violable rule, the definition that denies there there is a "correct" usage other than that used by people-in-general. But if he does this, he does the one thing that his inviolable rule prohibits. He substitutes a "correct" definition whose existence his basic premise denies for the only definition that his basic premise -- his inviolable rule -- grants as legitimate, the definition used by people-in-general.

"The descriptivist cannot argue that people-in-general are incorrect in defining a "dictionary" as giving correct usage because "incorrect" (or "wrong") has no meaning in the descriptivist universe (except, perhaps, to describe misrepresentation of the usage of people-in-general, which is just what the descriptivist does if he alters the definition of "dictionary" used by people-in-general; people-in-general cannot, according to the descriptivist premise, be incorrect).

"Whether the descriptivist accepts the definition of "dictionary" used by people-in-general or rejects the definition used by people-in-general, the descriptivist's descriptivism is exposed as rotten at its core. Note that the contradiction is not merely an oddity relevant only to a single definition. The problem of defining "dictionary" is but a focused view of a contradiction that infuses all of descriptivism and that can be stated without reference to a definition of "dictionary". The general contradiction is that descriptivism is founded on an axiom that accepts "A" (popular usage) and rejects "B" (any other authority or criterion for correctness) even when acceptance of "A" commits descriptivism to an accepance of "B", which is rejected by the axiom ("A") that requires its acceptance."

I think this argument is flawed for a number of reasons. Here are a few.

1. I think Goldberg caricatures what descriptivists believe. A descriptivist wouldn't say that meaning is determined the use of "people-in-general", because words don't have single meanings. For example, what if exactly 50% of "people-in-general" think a word means one thing, while exactly 50% of "people-in-general" think it means another? Then there is no one meaning held by "people-in-general" at all. For another, words have multiple meanings and shades of meaning. Sometimes these meanings can even be the opposites of each other. What, for example, do "people-in-general" mean by the word "cleave"? On the one hand, it can mean "to stick together". But it can also mean "to cut apart". Then there are words whose meanings have gradually shifted over time, such as "nubile". Originally, it meant "marriageable", but these days it seems to be used more as if it means "young and sexy".

2. I think Goldberg caricatures what "people-in-general" believe about the meaning of the word "dictionary". It may well be that "people-in-general" think of a dictionary roughly like what Goldberg claims: as a book "giving correct definitions, correctness being determined by a literary elite". But if you ask "people-in-general" whether they think a dictionary can ever contain an incorrect definition, or is it necessarily always right, I'd be very surprised if they choose the latter option. Furthermore, there is not a single dictionary accepted by all English-speaking people, but many different ones. "People-in-general" will have to concede that these many different dictionaries may disagree on the meaning of a word. So a descriptivist may well define "dictionary" as "a book containing usually-correct definitions, approved by a literary elite" and still satisfy the beliefs of "people-in-general". But then Goldberg's "contradiction" disappears.

3. The dictionary definition of "dictionary" doesn't usually claim its definitions are correct. For example, picking a dictionary at random from the web, I find the first definition of "dictionary" as "A reference book containing an alphabetical list of words, with information given for each word, usually including meaning, pronunciation, and etymology." Given that, maybe "people-in-general" don't assume what Goldberg claims they do.

4. "People-in-general" may well believe that a word has a certain definition but that does not necessarily mean that the object that the word refers to actually exists. For example, "people-in-general" might define "unicorn" as "a goat-like animal with magical powers and a single horn", but that doesn't mean that unicorns actually exist or have magical powers. Acknowledging this doesn't violate the descriptivist position; the descriptivist need not be a moron. So "people-in-general" may believe that a dictionary is a book "giving correct definitions, correctness being determined by a literary elite", but that doesn't necesssarily believe that such a book actually exists. Thus, a descriptivist can, without fear of contradiction, believe both that "people-in-general" think "dictionary" has this meaning on the one hand, and also believe that no such book as described by "people-in-general" actually exists in the real world.

So while I find Goldberg's attempt interesting, I think it is a failure.